I like the idea that who I am is competing brain modules, not a distinct self

UPDATE: If you want to get the gist of Kurzban's book in a 17 minute video, rather than buying and reading the book, here's Kurzban explaining some central concepts about the brain that cause us humans to be hypocrites. 

Having finished Robert Kurzban's book, Why everyone (else) is a hypocrite: Evolution and the modular mind, it's time to share some (possibly) final thoughts about the book before it gets shelved away.

The basic notion of brain modules has grown on me. Though computer analogies are risky when discussing how the brain works -- the human brain is what it is, not a computer -- Kurzban likens modules to subroutines that get called on to perform some special function.

These aren't physical parts of the brain. They're functions spread out across the brain's complex architecture. 

Mindfulness practice suggests labeling as a worthwhile activity. Meaning, if I'm anxious about something, telling myself "worrying is happening" can provide a certain distance between me and that emotion.

After reading this book, I've adapted that advice to say "worry module is active," or words to that effect. For me, this works even better than "worrying is happening," because viewing myself as composed of modules reduces my perception of myself being a distinct unified self.

Instead, I'm a collection of modular processes crafted by evolution. These modules mostly work unconsciously below the surface of awareness. What Kurzban calls the "press secretary" is the module most of us view as Me.

When the workings of a module become partly conscious, the press secretary describes what's going on both to the outside world and to our inside world -- those voices that speak within our head in the form of thoughts, images, and other forms of mental chatter. 

Kurzban stresses that evolution cares about our genes being passed on to the next generation. Knowing the truth about ourselves, or feeling good about ourself, is a lesser priority, if a priority at all.

Imagine a brain that when faced with a bear, instead of feeling all those unpleasant things like fear and terror, bathes itself in contentment. A bear... I think I will experience "flow" and be in the moment, me and the bear... I am one with the bear... ahhhh... AAAHHH!... 

The bear food brain is no more plausible than the brain that arrives at various facts -- like Fred's belief that he's not going to die of cancer -- because doing so is "protective" or "feels good." Mechanisms whose function is to make someone feel good per se have no real function at all as far as evolution is concerned, since the feeling itself is invisible to selection.

For most of my life I've felt that something was wrong with me if I didn't feel good. But this assumes there is a "me" who doesn't feel good, and an "I" who worries about the inability of "me" to feel good. In line with Buddhist philosophy and modern neuroscience, the modular view of the brain undermines this assumption.

Which I find highly reassuring. It's sort of akin to me not worrying about the health of my entire iPhone when an app stops working as it should because I know that the apps are separate entities, so a malfunction with one doesn't mean the whole device is messed up.

Similarly, an understanding of brain modules allows us to look upon our diverse thoughts, emotions, intentions, actions, and such as separate mental processes. If one module is doing something painful, distressing, or unproductive, this doesn't mean my whole psyche is messed up.

Here's Kurzban speaking about preferences.

The evidence reviewed here suggests that we shouldn't think of preferences as being things that are recorded in people's heads. Decisions are the result of the operation of different subroutines of the mind being brought to bear on individual decision problems. 

For this reason, far from being consistent, choices change depending on the way different modules operate. Because modules work differently depending on context, state, and history, changing any of these things might change the decisions we observe.

...Indeed, various threads across different fields have been converging on the view that far from preferences being listed in a book in one's head, they are constructed on the fly as one is faced with different decisions.

In any case, if choices are the result of the activity of different modules, each of which operates by its own evolved logic, then it's no wonder that people's choices look so inconsistent, even reversing themselves.

It's because there's no particular reason that they would look consistent. If the context one's in, or the state one's in, turns certain modules on, then the preferences in those modules will drive one's performance. In a different context, the very same options will be evaluated by different modules, leading to the possibility of a different choice being made.

So when you ask what pen I want, you can't think that you're just asking "me" what pen I want. You're asking the modules that are active in the particular context in which you ask me.

Near the end of his book, Kurzban has a passage about hypocrisy -- an important concept, since it's in the title of the book.

Modularity explains why everyone is a hypocrite. Moral(istic) modules constrain others' behavior. The mob's moral sticks can be used to prevent an arbitrarily wide set of acts. At the same time, other modules advance our own fitness interests, often by doing the very same acts our moral modules condemn.

In this sense, the explanation for hypocrisy lies in the rather quotidian notion of competition. Organisms are designed to advance their own fitness interests, which entails harming others and helping oneself and one's allies. Hypocrisy is, in its most abstract sense, no different from other kinds of competition. 

So if hypocrisy is nothing less -- but nothing more -- than a manifestation of competition, then why does it seem so offensive?

...The answer lies in the nature of morality. One might wonder why morality evolved in the first place, but a key feature of morality is that humans seem designed to accept -- even create -- rules that constrain their own behavior, as long as these rules constrain others' behavior as well. 

Morality can be seen as the informal equivalent of a justice system. I'll agree to rules that specify that I can be punished for various deeds, but only as long as everyone else is subject to the same rules. This makes sense; we shouldn't expect evolved creatures to be designed to consent to limit their own options, but not others'.

Comments

[sant64 Grok]

Flaws and Limitations in Kurzban’s Views

While Kurzban’s framework is compelling and grounded in evolutionary psychology, it has several flaws and limitations when applied to understanding morality and hypocrisy:

Overreliance on Modularity
Flaw: Kurzban’s heavy emphasis on the modular mind oversimplifies the complexity of human cognition. The modularity hypothesis, while supported by some neuroscientific evidence (e.g., localized brain functions), is debated. Critics like Jerry Fodor, who pioneered modularity, argue that higher-order cognition (e.g., moral reasoning) involves more integrated processes. By attributing hypocrisy primarily to modular conflicts, Kurzban may downplay the role of conscious deliberation, cultural learning, or emotional integration in shaping moral behavior.

Critique: This reductionist view risks portraying humans as mere puppets of competing modules, neglecting how individuals can override modular impulses through reflection or socialization. For example, moral philosophies like Kantian ethics emphasize rational consistency, which can counteract hypocritical tendencies, yet Kurzban’s model gives little weight to such mechanisms.

Underestimation of Cultural and Social Influences
Flaw: Kurzban’s evolutionary focus prioritizes universal, biological drivers of hypocrisy but underplays the role of culture and social context in shaping moral norms and hypocritical behavior. Cross-cultural studies, such as those by Joseph Henrich, show that moral systems vary widely, influenced by religion, institutions, and historical context. Kurzban’s framework struggles to explain why hypocrisy manifests differently across societies (e.g., public shaming in collectivist cultures vs. individual guilt in Western ones).

By framing hypocrisy as a universal byproduct of modularity, Kurzban misses how social structures amplify or mitigate hypocritical behavior. For instance, institutional accountability (e.g., transparent governance) can reduce hypocrisy, but Kurzban’s model focuses on individual cognition rather than systemic factors.

Neglect of Moral Agency
Flaw: Kurzban’s view that hypocrisy is an inevitable outcome of modular conflicts can undermine the concept of moral agency. If hypocrisy is “natural,” it risks excusing deliberate moral failings or bad faith. Philosophical perspectives, such as those of Jean-Paul Sartre, emphasize that individuals are responsible for their actions, even when they involve self-deception. Kurzban’s deterministic tone may absolve people of accountability for hypocritical behavior.

Critique: This perspective could weaken efforts to foster moral consistency, as it suggests hypocrisy is unavoidable rather than something individuals can work to minimize through self-awareness or ethical training. Psychological interventions, like cognitive-behavioral therapy, show that people can align their actions with their values, challenging Kurzban’s fatalism.

Limited Explanation of Moral Progress
Flaw: Kurzban’s evolutionary lens struggles to account for moral progress, such as the reduction of practices like slavery or the expansion of universal human rights. If morality is merely a strategic tool for evolutionary fitness, it’s unclear why societies develop more inclusive or consistent moral frameworks over time. His focus on hypocrisy as a static feature of human nature overlooks how collective moral reasoning can reshape norms and reduce certain forms of hypocrisy.

A broader framework incorporating social evolution, as proposed by thinkers like Peter Singer, could better explain how moral systems evolve beyond individual modular conflicts. Kurzban’s model is less equipped to address systemic changes that align actions with professed values.

Potential Dismissal of Genuine Moral Convictions: By framing moral beliefs as strategic signals for social advantage, Kurzban risks reducing all morality to self-interest. This cynical view may not fully capture cases where individuals act morally at great personal cost (e.g., whistleblowers or activists). Psychological research on moral identity suggests that some people internalize moral principles as core to their self-concept, not just as tools for social gain.

Kurzban’s dismissal of “sincere” morality as rare or illusory could oversimplify the motivations behind moral behavior. Integrating insights from moral psychology, such as Jonathan Haidt’s moral foundations theory, might provide a more nuanced view of how genuine convictions coexist with hypocritical tendencies.

Lilliputian (Small but Notable) Issue: The book’s provocative title and tone may alienate readers who see hypocrisy as a moral failing worth addressing rather than a quirky evolutionary byproduct. While Kurzban’s humorous style makes the book accessible, it risks trivializing the harm caused by hypocrisy (e.g., in politics or relationships), limiting its appeal to those seeking practical solutions.
Critique: A more balanced tone that acknowledges the social and ethical consequences of hypocrisy could strengthen the book’s impact without sacrificing its scientific rigor.

Robert Kurzban’s Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite offers a provocative and scientifically grounded explanation of morality and hypocrisy, rooted in the modular mind’s evolutionary origins. However, its flaws include an overreliance on modularity, insufficient attention to cultural and social influences, a deterministic view that downplays moral agency, limited explanation of moral progress, and a potentially reductive view of moral convictions. These limitations suggest that while Kurzban’s framework illuminates the cognitive roots of hypocrisy, it could be enriched by integrating cultural, philosophical, and systemic perspectives to provide a fuller account of human morality and its inconsistencies.

[Brian Hines]

sant64, I see you're still addicted to copying and pasting AI searches rather than expressing your own views. At least this time you called Grok to your user name to indicate that these aren't your views but those of an AI -- so I'll reward you by leaving this comment up.

Just to show you that you can get out of an AI very different responses based on how a question is asked, here's how ChatGPT replied when I asked it about reviews of Kurzban's book. Pretty positive.
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Robert Kurzban's Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite: Evolution and the Modular Mind has been well-received for its engaging exploration of human inconsistency through the lens of evolutionary psychology.​

Critical Reception
Publishers Weekly describes the book as an "entertaining explanation of brain functioning," highlighting its humorous footnotes and examples that make a convincing case for the modular mind. ​

Foreword Reviews praises Kurzban's wit and accessibility, noting that he "touches on complex topics in a manner that’s both smart and accessible," making the science behind his theory understandable to a broad audience. ​

Scientific American Mind summarizes the book's thesis by stating that "hypocrisy is the natural state of the human mind," due to the specialized units within the mind not always working together seamlessly. ​

Reader Feedback
On Goodreads, the book holds an average rating of 3.95 out of 5, based on over 850 ratings and 100 reviews. Readers appreciate its engaging writing style and thought-provoking insights into human behavior.​

Chris Boutté, a reader and content creator, shared his enthusiasm:​

"This book is amazing, and it’s not too complex for laypeople like myself. Kurzban also brings up some philosophical topics in the book like our sense of 'self' as well as some moral philosophy." ​

Overall, Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite is acclaimed for its insightful and humorous examination of the human mind's modular nature. Both critics and readers find it a compelling read that challenges conventional notions of self and behavior.​

If you're interested in exploring how our minds might be composed of specialized modules leading to contradictory behaviors, this book offers an accessible and thought-provoking perspective.

[sant64]

Dear Brian. Your essay on hypocrisy (irony alert) re Kurzban's arcane theories is mostly just a recitation of his views, including copy and paste from Kurzban's book. In other words, you went to a source and copied and pasted it here. So the blame-casting I don't get.

On reading your offering of Kurban's views, I could smell the determinism, but used Grok to validate. And sure enough, Grok tells us that many critics of Kurban, experts in this field far above you and I, say Kurzban's theories lean hard into determinism, and that that's a flaw.

You and the readership can draw your own conclusions. No wait we can't, because we have no free will.

[Brian Hines]

sant64, you copied and pasted something from Grok. I copied and pasted something from ChatGPT, a rival AI. My point is that it is easy to get the answer you want by phrasing a question in a certain way. That's why it's better to express your own opinion about some subject, perhaps augmented by some short references to an AI query. From now on I won't be publishing any more lengthy AI copy and paste comments from you. I did it this time to show the limits of AI queries, which often are wrong.

[Appreciative Reader]

Just finished watching the embedded vid. Interesting.

My immediate knee-jerk here would be to wonder how accurate is a modular representation of the brain, given that unlike apps developed separately from one another, our brain functions have all arisen organically from the same impulses, and that keep interacting with one another at all times.

Which is not an objection, at all, but a question.

It would be cool if it happens that Kurzban has addressed this in his book.

In any case, and like I said, it was interesting, this model of the mind as a collection of modules.

[Brian Hines]

Appreciative Reader, since Kurzban is an evolutionary psychologist, I'm sure he wouldn't disagree with you about brain modules arising organically together, and interacting together at all times. But just as evolution is, simplistically put, about competition and "survival of the fittest," Kurzban argues that modules function in the same way. They compete with each other for attention and brain/body resources.

This is the source of our familiar mental dilemmas. Part of us wants to have an extra piece of cake for dessert because it tastes so good. Part of us doesn't want to have an extra piece of cake because we're pained when we get on the scale and find that we've gained weight. Part of us wants to flirt with that attractive person at a party because we have a drive to have sex with attractive people. Part of us doesn't want to flirt or have sex with the attractive person because we love our spouse and don't want to lose them.

Whichever module wins out depends on a host of factors. Past experiences, culture, immediate circumstances, presence or absence of other people, no end to the list. We contain multitudes within us. They're chattering away beneath the surface of awareness. Then one wins out and enters our consciousness and we choose whether to have that piece of cake or flirt with that person. The decision seems to come from "us," but actually it stems from deeper sources beyond our conscious awareness.

I was planning to do something else just now. But I saw your comment and decided that something else could wait. It seemed like I was making a freely willed decision, yet I believe the decision was determined by forces outside of my conscious awareness.

[Appreciative Reader]

Thanks, Brian, that makes sense. That does address our separate, disparate, sometimes conflicting drives and impulses.

What I was wondering about is how, despite not actually being the result of wholly different and independent processes (as apps are), these modules in their working might be so entirely ...different, alien, from one another, that the net result of it all would tantamount to hypocrisy. Surely hypocrisy points to a certain lack of self-awareness, as well as a curious ...I don't know, a lack of a certain integration, in some individuals, among those modules?

I mean, it's one thing to be attracted to a girl that I think is hot, and quite another to act on it despite not being single. If I were the kind of person that were to give in to the latter impulse, then it would take either a singular lack of self-awareness, or else a singular lack of some other organizing feature among these modules, for that self-knowledge to not temper my moralistic stance over straying (even should one of my "modules" bring forth such a stance).

In other words, different modules perfectly explain disparate conflicting drives, but probably do not completely discuss the discordance arising out of these modules, that might be seen as hypocrisy.

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To me, a modules-based model of the mind seems incomplete without also bringing in a function that integrates the output of these different modules. A faculty of integration that works fairly well in some, and not very well in others, particularly when it comes to the part where the penguin dad goes moralizing about how penguins should conduct themselves generally....After all, most good decent people aren't actually hypocrites, are they, not in things that matter (as opposed to minor things that don't)? The fact that some people are hypocrites does not mean that everyone is!

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I've no doubt Kurzban knows what he's talking about, and would have adequately accounted for my rather obvious take on this! Just wondering whether, and how, this figures in within his schema.