Feeling you know isn't the same as knowing

One of the benefits of reading a book about pure awareness by a philosopher, instead of someone who identifies with a religion or spiritual practice, is that you get a more realistic perspective.

A good example is that Thomas Metzinger, the author of The Elephant and the Blind, speaks in an early chapter about the difference between a feeling of knowing and actual knowing.

This should be obvious to anyone, which really is everyone, who has confidently believed that something was true until they learned that it wasn't. 

Metzinger calls this the E-fallacy. His glossary defines it this way:

A logical error consisting in falsely concluding that a consciously experienced feeling of knowing is a reliable indicator of actually possessing knowledge. 

As such, verbal reports referring to a phenomenal signature of knowing or an intuitive sense of "just knowing" do not imply or license any theoretical claims about consciousness itself, the metaphysical nature of reality, the "true" self, and so on, because all such claims need an independent epistemic justification. 

A related error is the C-fallacy.

A logical error consisting in falsely concluding that just because something feels like the very essence of consciousness, it is also a reliable indicator of actually being in touch with consciousness per se. 

As such, verbal reports referring to having experienced an "essence" or "pure consciousness in and of itself" do not imply or license any claims as to the actual existence of such an essence because all such claims need an independent epistemic justification.

This is a theme I've harped on many times over the years, though not in the rather rigorous way Metzinger describes the fallacies. The simpler way I like to put it is along these lines.

Everyone is entitled to their own beliefs, but not their own facts. If someone has an experience of God, spirit, soul, heaven, angels, higher consciousness, or whatever, wonderful. Tell us about it. Personal stories are interesting. But don't claim you've grasped an aspect of objective reality unless you can back up that claim with demonstrable evidence. 

A corollary is that you shouldn't get annoyed if someone else asks for that evidence after you've made an objective truth-claim that's based only on your subjective personal experience. 

Metzinger says this in a chapter on "Suchness," a familiar Buddhist concept of what is. 

Before we move on, please recall how the phenomenal experience of knowing does not entail that one really possesses knowledge. A strong and robust experience of knowing, even of absolute certainty, can occur during hallucinations, in dreams, and during psychiatric diseases or epileptic seizures. In chapter 7, we termed this the "E-fallacy."

Equally, the exerience of having "direct" or "immediate" knowledge of what is does not imply any kind of justification or directness from an epistemological perspective. Epistemologically, there is no certainty here. All we have is the phenomenal experience of immediacy, and "suchness" is being used here solely as a phenomenological concept. 

In connection with the experience of suchness, Rob Burbea also has made clear for contemplative practice itself that any remaining form of intuitive realism is an obstacle that must be overcome.

In interpreting all the reports in this chapter, therefore, we must be careful not to jump to overly naive and simplistic interpretations of "direct perception" and the reported phenomenology of nonconceptually seeing what is. The experiences themselves are simply much too interesting.

Experiences are real. For the person having them. For other people, there's no way to know either (1) what the experience really was like for the person having it, or (2) if the experience points to a fact about objective reality.

Someone who is a big fan of Taylor Swift likely will have a marvelous time at one of her concerts. Their experience has a strong chance of being highly memorable, something to be cherished for a lifetime. Someone who can't stand Taylor Swift likely will have a horrible time at one of her concerts. Their experience has a strong chance of being highly forgettable, something to be banished from memory as rapidly as possible. 

It would be crazy to argue that a Taylor Swift concert is either objectively pleasurable or painful. That depends on the experience of every attendee. Same applies to conclusions about the appeal of religions, mystical practices, or spiritual paths. That depends on the experience of every devotee. 

Comments

[um]

The fact that one cannot refute the words of a scientist, doesn't mean what he writes or says is correct even.

He is human like all others.
The only difference is that he uses a particular [academical] jargon] to say simple things in a complicated matter.

He, is like one of the people that thinks that his description of the elephant is the only correct, while doing the same.

The standardized descriptions we have created and used in the "public domain" in order to live as peaceful possible together, are by necessity almost lifeless. ...imagine if those words get hold of your brain.as representing the reality.

[777]

Just compare :
Science now changed Big Bangs age
They doubled it to compile what JWST info

A simple indian initiated among millions
and she really sees how myriads of universes were established
plus what her own role is in all that
and the Love implied

777

[777]

Tayler might br hell
even YUYA playing RACH

But 432Hz stands firm

I likr the même : SUCHNESS
and it s clear

777

"What a moron" we would feel about God
if we would easily concepted Him/Her after some scientific study

but not after seeing She is Yourself voluntary amnesia

[Brian Hines]

um and 777, your comments make the point of this post. Each of you feels like what you said in the comments is meaningful to you, that it makes sense, while there's no independent evidence of this, since the comments neither relate to what was said in the post nor to anything real in the world. The comments are just ramblings of your minds without any meaning to most people, certainly to me. So thanks for being examples of people who feel they know something, yet really don't.

[sant64]

"It would be crazy to argue that a Taylor Swift concert is either objectively pleasurable or painful. That depends on the experience of every attendee. Same applies to conclusions about the appeal of religions, mystical practices, or spiritual paths. That depends on the experience of every devotee."

Did you mean to write "conclusions about the results"? The appeal of religion, like all appeals, is always based on anticipated pleasure. The results of practicing said religion may not be pleasurable. For example, the appeal of joining RSSB may be the anticipation of incredible meditation experiences, an intimate mystical relationship with a perfect master, assurance of paradise when one dies, etc. The actual results after RSSB initiation may be mystically satisfactory, or the initiate might experience dissatisfaction with mediocre meditations and tedious satsangs.

Another apt example might be vipassana meditation retreats. Those 10 day affairs one promise a revolutionary cleansing of one's psyche. At the outset of these retreats is anticipation of an adventure into bliss. Some do find bliss there. But some participants actual experience (such as mine) find the 10 days to be a painful ordeal I was glad to be well shed of. Those who aren't thrilled with the 10 days are, according to Goenka, those of not a little dust. By the same token, Goenka tells of trying to run away from his first 10 day because the suffering was so intense. One can conclude that it's not so simple to say a religion is a zero-sum of either pleasure or pain.

But of course, de gustibus, some people will like a religion, some won't. However, the very fact that a religion exists is evidence that at least some people will find it pleasurable. And that fact, the fact that some people find the religion pleasurable, is objective evidence that...some people will find the religion pleasurable.

And so I'm not sure of your argument. Should every Taylor Swift concert promotion and review contain a disclaimer that your pleasure mileage of her music may vary? Obviously not, and so why should religion and philosophy be held to that standard?

How about your essays on various religions and philosophies, including atheism -- should they as well come with a caveat that your ideas may be wrong and lead to suffering?

[um]

@ Brian

I will take away this ongoing source of irritation away from you, your body is already aching enough

Let me use this message of you as an excuse to stop writing and reading here.
and I wish you many new visitors that that fit better to the wall paper of this internet inn.

Best to all of Yo

Special thanks to AR .. it has always been a pleasure dealing with yo

[um]

@ Brian

and of course many new characters like Kranvir, Trez to make your day.

[sant64]

As to Metzinger's "elephant and the blind" metaphor and his broader philosophical stance:

Metzinger's theory of consciousness as a constructed model may overly discount the direct and immediate nature of subjective experience. Critics suggest that there is a phenomenological richness to subjective experience that cannot be fully captured by reducing it to a constructed model. They argue that subjective experiences like pain, emotions, or sensory perceptions feel immediate and real, regardless of their cognitive underpinnings.

There are also concerns about the epistemological implications of Metzinger's view. For example, how we can trust any knowledge or understanding about reality if our subjective experience is fundamentally disconnected or constructed. This raises issues about the nature of knowledge and truth, and whether a completely constructed model of consciousness undermines our ability to make meaningful claims about the external world.

Also, Metzinger's theory may have unsettling ethical and existential implications. If our conscious experience is merely a constructed model, it could challenge notions of personal identity, free will, and moral responsibility. Such a view could lead to nihilism or a sense of disconnection from reality and other individuals. This is a point that I keep hammering on with this and so many other essays from this blog and its celebration of radical reductionism, which I value as a tool but not a conclusion.

[777]

QUBIT s can tell somewhat better
but we are to old to witness their potential

For the time being
Science agrees that the chance that there is NO Creator
is 9-9^9^9 (^= to the power of)

Best is to BE HER
and not tell, as Brian correct stated
One cannot even 'tell" another informed Soul
One can only sigh OMG
and applaud HER immense EQ & IQ each nano second

777 at 87*

TRY 432Hz, it will help U
https://x.com/Ankhaton/status/1762250953854493056/video/1

[Ron E.]

sant64’s comments re his fears that our conscious experience being a construct and personal identity, free will and moral responsibility could lead to nihilism and a sense of disconnection from reality are quite unfounded.

There has been a lot of research and literature in recent times regarding the illusion of having a self (a separate identity), and indeed, the self is an ideal candidate for exhibiting the theory that it is a mental construct. Jay Garfield’s book ‘Loosing Ourselves’ makes an excellent case for losing the self and posits that, not only is there no self but that having a self is even a dangerous thing.

My current thinking is that realising much of what we once thought to be solid entities emanating from specific areas of the brain/body (and even for some, believing they are non-physical) now actually appear to be just predictive constructs; albeit constructs that serve a useful and necessary survival function.

And consciousness, well, I take the view that it arose millions of years ago from simple organisms that developed the sense of being aware of what is ‘me’ and ‘not me’, later to become organisms that were aware of themselves and later even self-awareness.

I also think that it is much safer and saner for us to be basically run by our biology’s rather that some mysterious self entities that can often be the source of our widespread almost neurotic human beliefs, thinking and actions that dictate many of our conflicts and subsequent suffering.

[7 mundane]

Brian
You wrote u have Starlink V°4 now
What is the US $ price?
and how fast is it?

I have V° 3 in France -it goes 80 Mb/sec with regular interuptions of 90 sec
while changing satellite

Sorry for the topic

7

GROK WROTE Regarding your question about purchasing a Starlink device from the US and using it in France, it is likely that it would work. Starlink is a global internet service, and the devices are designed to work in various countries. However, it's essential to check Starlink's official website or contact their customer service to confirm if there are any specific requirements or limitations for using a device purchased in the US in France.

[Brian Hines]

7 mundane, the usual price here in the U.S is $599 for the dish and router. A mount for the dish is extra, though it comes with one suitable for sitting on the ground. Just now the speed was 339 Mbps down and 31 Mbps up. That's faster than usual. We rarely have interruptions any more and when they happen they're just for a few seconds, usually not noticeable.

[Appreciative Reader]

Likewise, um. I've always enjoyed our interactions here.

If you wish to withdraw from here, then I respect your decision. But if after a brief respite you think it fit to return, then that will be very welcome, as far as I am concerned (and for what that is worth).

Until next time, then.

[Appreciative Reader]

Loved this post. Never thought of it in those precise terms, but I resonate with what this man, Metzinger, spells out so beautifully and clearly: All claims need an epistemic justification.

That recalls two things, two ...lines of thought, where, had I come across this post first, I might have ended up arriving much quicker at the conclusion that I eventually did arrive at.

The first is a lengthy discussion I'd had with Osho Robbins --- whom I sincerely like and admire, even if I don't agree with everything he says --- where that was the point where his case came unstuck: the fact that he wad unable to explain the "epistemic justification" of his alleged insight. That discussion, interesting as it was, would have been far more ...crisp and focused, had I known then to look specifically for this angle (rather than ending up arriving at it organically, and slowly, over a long-meandering exchange).

And the second instance is one of the things I've found a bit ...off, with Buddhistic insights (and Advaitic, and Daoic, as well). There's much that's wise there; and much that is, not unsurprisingly, not wise. But that's not the point. The point is, what I've commented here in the past in more vague terms than the precise language employed here by Metzinger: What exactly is the epistemic justification of what they teach? ...It all comes down to a black-and-white either-or: Either we toss aside their wisdom, or at least treat it as random guesses arrived at by chance; or else we investigate seriously the epistemic route followed by them as a valid route towards arriving at the truth (quite apart from the specific conclusions they teach).

Enjoyed this post, great food for thought.

[7]

TY Brian
I think it over
highest upload now is 180 but 80 mostly

RS
7