No free will is easily misunderstood. Some blog comments prove that.

I readily confess to being a no-free-will addict. However, I'd never join a 12-step program aimed at, um, freeing me from this addiction, because I consider it a good thing to embrace the reality of determinism instead of the illusion of free will.

I've been feeding my taste for no-free-will for quite a few years. I've read every book published in English on this subject that I can find. Some of them have been read repeatedly.

Most recently, I studied Robert Sapolsky's instant classic Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will closely, since Sapolsky has written the definitive critique of the illusion of free will. So far; maybe an even better book will come along.

As noted in my previous post, I've also been listening to You Tube videos of interviews of Sapolsky by a variety of  people. In the interview I'm watching currently while I exercise, Sapolsky says that almost universally philosophers hate his book.

Well, I consider that a plus, given that most philosophers believe in the nonsensical notion of compatibilism -- the absurd thesis that even though determinism rules the brain/mind, free will is compatible with determinism as long as someone isn't physically confined.

I'm philosophically inclined. So are some of the commenters on my blog posts. I've got no problem with philosophizing. But in my own small way, sort of like Sapolsky, I find myself having to defend blog posts I've written about the illusion of free will against criticisms that don't make sense to me.

Here's some examples from one of two comments on my previous post by always-thoughtful Appreciative Reader. He and I agree that free will doesn't exist. However, Appreciative Reader had some quibbles with my position on free will that seem misguided to me. Here's why.

In one comment, he said:

What I'm arguing against is what you'd previously quoted and linked to Sapolsky having said --- and although you don't spell out the argument again, but you do touch on it here briefly as well, in saying that the Dalai Lama is no more deserving of praise for his pacificism, than, presumably, a Hitler or a Netanyahu might be deserving of censure for their barbarity and their wanton disdain of human suffering. That specific part, that moral argument, I'm afraid I find myself questioning.

First, I never said that the Dalai Lama wasn't deserving of praise, nor that Hitler or a Netanyahu weren't deserving of censure. All I said about the Dalai Lama was:

What matters is that prior causes determine what living beings do, with no exceptions. This applies as much to a sea slug as to a Nobel prize winner or the Dalai Lama or anyone else. So even though Shermer and Sapolsky are both accomplished men, Sapolsky argued that neither of them deserve praise for their achievements, since they weren't responsible for them.

I stand behind that statement 100%. Note that when I said praise isn't deserved by anybody, the reason is that they weren't responsible for the achievements that supposedly merit praise. Since Appreciative Reader agrees that free will doesn't exist, I assume he would agree with this.

That leaves the issue of supporting people who do positive things and condemning people who do negative things. Sapolsky is totally fine with this, as am I, and as is every author who writes about the illusion of free will that I've read.

Think about it this way. A large primate, a gorilla or chimpanzee, say, kills a human. Or on the plus side, learns how to communicate with humans via sign language. Would we say that the primate deserves condemnation for the killing or praise for learning sign language? 

No. Condemnation or praise imply that the primate made a freely chosen decision to do what they did. Likewise, we wouldn't condemn a wolf pack that killed sheep in a rancher's field. We'd simply recognize that this is what wolves do, kill vulnerable prey.

So where is the rationale for condemning or praising humans? Do our minds/brains possess some free will magic that our fellow primates lack? No. Sapolsky is a primatologist. And a human. Thus he's well qualified to argue, as he does, that our actions are as determined as the actions of any other animal.

Appreciative Reader then says:

You start with that implicit premise; then show that there's no free will (an argument I fully agree with, I mean specifically the argument that there's no free will); and that leads you to the very odd conclusion that no one is deserving of admiration or censure. Well, what I question is that premise, which has been slipped in implicitly, undefended, surreptitiously as it were.

Think about it: Sure, we have no free will. Sure, everything is determined (bar the quantum randomness thing). But why would that mean that something good that someone does is not to be admired?

Well, again, words are being attributed to me that I'm pretty sure I haven't said in any of the posts I've written about the illusion of free will. I've said that no one is deserving of praise or blame. But admiration or censure? That's a different thing.

What's important to remember here is the difference between scientific reality and everyday life. As I've noted before, and surely will again (like right now), I'm confident even astronomers say "Wow, what a beautiful sunset," even though they know that the sun isn't really setting, the Earth is turning.

Similarly, the key point that Sapolsky makes in his 400 page book is that determinism rules the mind/brain, with not the slightest crevice where free will could enter. That's a bold assertion, but he does a great job of taking the best arguments in favor of free will and demolishing them.

Yet Sapolsky readily admits that even after his decades of researching and pondering this subject, he still lives his life as if he had free will, in much the same way that an astronomer looks upon a sunset even though it is impossible that the sun is setting. 

Admiration is a wonderful thing. So is condemnation or censure. These are natural reactions when we encounter something positive a person has done, or something negative. Again, I'm not aware that I've ever concluded in a blog post that admiration or condemnation should be avoided. I admire and condemn many times every day. Always have, always will.

I'll end by observing that this subject of the illusion of free will is both astoundingly simple and amazingly subtle.

I've spent so much time thinking about it, including visualizing instances in my own life where I wrongly felt (from my current understanding) that I deserved blame or praise, I consider that I've internalized the key arguments Sapolsky and Sam Harris make -- Sapolsky says that Sam Harris is brilliant in this regard, and he agrees completely with him -- to quite a high degree.

I realize that other people are coming to this subject with less exposure to it. Nonetheless, I resonate with Sapolsky's evident frustration when intelligent people, such as philosophers, fail to grasp basic facts about the argument he's making against free will.

Of course, that failure is determined, as is every other action by the mind/brain. To use Sapolsky's language, we may have read a book, or a blog post, a few days or weeks ago that introduces some new ideas about determinism in our psyche. But months, years, or decades ago, we were exposed to powerful cultural and society influences in favor of free will.

So it figures that grasping the subtleties of determinism and the illusion of free will is going to take some time and pondering. Even after all I've learned about this subject, my understanding still has a long ways to go. Which is why I'm grateful for the comments on my posts, whether they agree or disagree with my position on free will.

Gratitude, by the way, is an emotion that Sapolsky views as key to living wisely without a belief in free will. When things go well with us, we can be grateful that circumstances brought this about, even if we didn't of our own free will.

Comments

[booboobear]

but isn't gratitude also not in our free will?

[Spence Tepper]

"What matters is that prior causes determine what living beings do, with no exceptions."

This entire argument rests on a flawed assumption about time. Outside of conventional time cause and effect are no longer linear, nor is the relationship of events deterministic.

Once again we see an effort to reduce a pitifully short list of tiny and relativistic, dualistic elements of reality we have a fleeting and superficial awareness of, and create broad claims about a largely conjectured totality about which we know very little.

It is taking what we know in our teacup and making inferences about all the oceans that ever existed, all life and events in them and their relationship to pasr, present and future.

It's what the mind does, try to project as all reality from our tiny bag of chemicals and limited perception called the human brain. But it's not scientific and a poor use of reason.

Outside of present, past and future, cause and effect do not operate. Yet all reality exists and emerges in multiple dimensions, with time merely a local phenomenon.

The entire argument for determinism is way over generalized for what is just one drop in a sea of potential.

If we exist in that infinite sea, then what we do in the moment is not only important but of all importance. What we do that helps, absolute value. What we do that harms, valueless. No problem acknowldging it. Even praising it. If we are the units these things pass through we are absolutely responsible for what little of it we see, and what we choose to do with that.

[Spence Tepper]

Just to be clear, outside of time we are the cause we are the connected to. We are the determining factor for our own result.

"The son becomes the father of the man."
Freud

So that's on us. We just need to wake up to it and take responsibility for it.

[um]

@ Spence

Some. for good reason stated:
Do not speak about things that cannot be spoken of.

Mcs, stated in regard to education, give them a good example en let them grow.

In answer to a brother that wanted to know whether or not children should be educated in Sant Mat ... or ... the things you TALK about

Your words are meaningless without experience and when the experience is there they are not needed and your words are not going to created that experience in others.

My goodness where and how did you come to believe that words would matter?
At home at the dinner table??
The debating club avant la lettre?

Strange this reaction as the coffee was quite up to the mark.

[um]

@ spence

In a club "atheists only" you do not enter to bring "the word"
Where books are discussed nobody is interested in personal experiences.

[Sant64]

This interminable no-free-will crusade of yours...

"Well, I consider that a plus, given that most philosophers believe in the nonsensical notion of compatibilism -- the absurd thesis that even though determinism rules the brain/mind, free will is compatible with determinism as long as someone isn't physically confined."

You sound here like the flat earther who, when shown that the majority of scientists don't believe his views, is still convinced he's right and that everyone who disagrees with him is a dunce.

Daniel Dennett is a compatibilist. He's far smarter than you and put together. Why not read up on his arguments against the Sapolskly thesis? Have you looked at them?

All you're doing with this topic is stubbornly repeating yourself and it's going nowhere.

[um]

For the lovers of science and logic:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

And I excuse myself for the preference of drinking coffee.

[Spence Tepper]

Hi Um
That we know so little of this creation and that we exist in multiple dimensions simultaneously are scientific facts. And that we may exist in more is scientific conjecture.

That time has been witnessed to move backwards in quantum research, and that the measured "cause" has been influenced by the "effect" is scientific fact.

So is it scientific to quote out-of-date philosophical conjectures that in today's world must ignore these facts?

If cause and effect are the basis of the hypothesis of a universal and éxclusive eterminism, isn't that foundation shattered when, in careful scientific review, the effect altered the cause?

If one is going to postulate, let's do so without ignoring these facts.

Even part of every vehicle's moving wheels are moving backwards all the time,at speed, and the vehicle could not proceed forward otherwise.

The problem with any conjecture is that it is very time and fact sensitive. Old philosophies once based in science are often, in time, discredited by scientific progress.

But determinism is really older than science. Newton's Calculus and modern statistics actually require an assumption that time is not universal.

Philosophers, catch up to science, or risk creating a new religion of pseudoscience. Don't make the outdated notion of universal, exclusive and infinite determinism into a new religion. Because that is all it can be. Science has already moved past.

[um]

@Spence

I am neither in science nor philosophy....as they are not needed drinking and appreciating coffee.

>> In a club "atheists only" you do not enter to bring "the word"
Where books are discussed nobody is interested in personal experiences.<<

I was not discussing content, but social communication of content, based upon the advice of many honorable men

Wittgenstein wrote:
Do not spoeak about things that cannot be spoken of

That is an kind of algebraic formula

Do not speak to those that do not want to listen
etc.

Do not offer coffee to those that dislike it.

[umami]

I think I see the problem.

We're saying that free will, self and consciousness are products of emergent processes.
And we're saying that free will and self are illusions.
But we're not saying that consciousness is an illusion. Emergent, yes, but we don't argue against being conscious.
If free will and self are illusions, does it not follow that consciousness is an illusion?

How can an illusion have experience of itself? An illusion of an illusion? An illusion of an illusion of an illusion of an illusion of an illusion of an illusion...ad infinitum?

We almost have to take consciousness as the starting point.
Consciousness/existence, the same.
Life/death, the same.

"He did not care any more... life and death... the same. Only that the crowd would be there to greet him with howls of lust and fury. He began to realize his sense of worth... he mattered. In time, his victories could not easily be counted... he was taken to the east, a great prize, where the war masters would teach him the deepest secrets. Language and writing were also made available, the poetry of Khitai, the philosophy of Sung; and he also came to know the pleasures of women, when he was bred to the finest stock. But, always, there remained the discipline of steel."
~The Wizard (Conan the Barbarian)

[Spence Tepper]

Hi Um
You wrote
"Do not speak to those that do not want to listen
etc.

" Do not offer coffee to those that dislike it."

Yet you proceed for your own reasons.

So you think Brian only writes to those he agrees with? What is the enlightenment in that?

You think science should be guided only by what people want to believe?

How would we know about global warming with that standard? And every other inconvenient truth?

How would we know that the earth rotates around the sun?

You think these were popular ideas?

They came through people compelled by Philosophy..Love of Truth.

Truth us our audience, and we always strive to honor her first.

And trusting that people are far more intelligent than people give them credit for, we proceed in full faith that we are making good use of time, and might actually be easing, somewhere, someone's pain.

We know for certain that bigotry and defeatism at the fear of bigotry is harmful to everyone, however much of a hand job it may be to the proud.

[Spence Tepper]

Defeatism at the feet of bigotry..

[Spence Tepper]

Hi Umami
Love Robert E. Howard.. Read all the Conan stories to my son at night for years.

The triumph of will over ignorance. The triumph of one man's conviction over armies.

Thrilling.

[umami]

But seriously, my sense of consciousness is much harder to dismiss than my sense of self and my sense of free will. So...?
Some something is conscious, even if it isn't "me" exactly? Consciousness just IS in the way that existence just IS?

[Appreciative Reader]

Brian, thanks very much for that detailed response! And for the link to Sapolsky’s interview as well, where he discusses this moral aspect of his no-free-will ideas.

But I’m afraid that focused question I’d asked earlier, and asked again now, that continues to go unaddressed. I’d pointed out the question begging, and the implicit assumption hidden away in this whole argument, that goes unexamined and undefended, accepted without question; and suggested that the argument itself is not valid unless this assumption can be defended. And that assumption is: praise, and condemnation, and admiration, and censure, and appreciation (in the sense of a “Well done!”, meant completely sincerely and not merely as a prop), and its obverse as well, are all necessarily predicated on free will, that is, on being able to do things regardless of what went before. I’m afraid my focused critique has still not been addressed!

But still, great food for thought, all of this. And I’d like to present my own thoughts about all of this, in some detail if I may.

I’ll try to present my thoughts in three parts: The first a rather trivial case of you-said-he-said; the second a somewhat fuller discussion around what I’ve already said in my last two comments, as it applies to your response; and the third a larger, broader critique of Sapolsky’s moral argument, and consequent moral position. And, I’m sorry, but in all three, I find myself, once again, disagreeing squarely with you!

----------

First, let me get out of the way the trivial you-said-he-said thing. Let me first quote at some length from your response, from your post:

Quote:
“First, I never said that the Dalai Lama wasn't deserving of praise, nor that Hitler or a Netanyahu weren't deserving of censure. All I said about the Dalai Lama was:
“What matters is that prior causes determine what living beings do, with no exceptions. This applies as much to a sea slug as to a Nobel prize winner or the Dalai Lama or anyone else. So even though Shermer and Sapolsky are both accomplished men, Sapolsky argued that neither of them deserve praise for their achievements, since they weren't responsible for them.
“I stand behind that statement 100%. Note that when I said praise isn't deserved by anybody, the reason is that they weren't responsible for the achievements that supposedly merit praise. “Since Appreciative Reader agrees that free will doesn't exist, I assume he would agree with this.
“That leaves the issue of supporting people who do positive things and condemning people who do negative things. Sapolsky is totally fine with this, as am I, and as is every author who writes about the illusion of free will that I've read.”

Agreed, I’d misread that. I see that the “don’t deserve praise” bit you’d directed at Shermer and at Sapolsky, and not the Dalai Lama. But while absolutely, I’d misread that: but really, that makes no difference, does it. The idea clearly is that no one deserves praise, and no one deserves the obverse of praise. (To be clear: I don’t merely mean “supporting people”, I mean actually praising them, praising them in every sense of the word. I mean admiration, in every sense of the word --- and praise, after all, if fully sincere, is simply the vocalization of admiration. And I also mean the obverse of praise and admiration, which is to say blame, when that is appropriate.

Isn’t that exactly what Sapolsky himself says, in the part that you quoted? That neither he himself, nor Shermer --- nor anyone else, obviously --- is deserving of praise, since they aren’t responsible for their achievements, etc? And that’s also what Sapolsky had said in the interview you’d linked some posts back; and also in the interview you’ve now linked.

His position is, indeed, that that not even the Dalai Lama is deserving of praise, and admiration; and the obverse of that, which he doesn’t spell out in the quoted bit, but if follows obviously, and in any case he does say it in so many words in the interview you’ve linked now, that no one is deserving of the obverse of praise, not even a Hitler, for instance.

This seems completely cut and dried to me, with zero scope of ambiguity! Sorry, Brian, I realize this part is completely trivial; but I’m not sure where you’re coming from, in suggesting that I’ve misrepresented your (and Sapolsky’s) position here. I’m sorry, but I don’t see that I have, at all! (Do correct me if I’m still misreading this, trivial though this part of it is!)

----------

This is the part where I retread what I’d already said, but in the specific terms of your response. This is the part where I point out, yet again, that my focused question of the implicit assumption, that had been surreptitiously hidden away, and that I ask for a clear defense of, goes once more directly taken for granted.

Again, let me start by quoting from your response:
“Think about it this way. A large primate, a gorilla or chimpanzee, say, kills a human. Or on the plus side, learns how to communicate with humans via sign language. Would we say that the primate deserves condemnation for the killing or praise for learning sign language?
“No. Condemnation or praise imply that the primate made a freely chosen decision to do what they did. Likewise, we wouldn't condemn a wolf pack that killed sheep in a rancher's field. We'd simply recognize that this is what wolves do, kill vulnerable prey. “So where is the rationale for condemning or praising humans? Do our minds/brains possess some free will magic that our fellow primates lack?

Nope. Don’t you see, Brian, that what you’re stating here, one more time, is simply an ipse dixitism, an assumption simply stated and …well, assumed, sans any kind of defense? I mean the part where you say, “Condemnation of praise imply that the primate made a freely chosen decision to do what they did.” That doesn’t follow --- at least not directly, not unless it can be explicitly shown that it does follow! Certainly not when “freely chosen” is taken in free-will terms, as opposed to compatibilist terms.

Free will is the ability to will something independently of precedent, deterministic causes. Agreed? We’ve already established, in our past discussions, that free will is different than options, choices. Agreed?

What the human brain possesses, that the wolf brain lacks, is not “magic”; it is the capacity for considered thought, for evaluating outcomes, for restraint. Which is why a very young child that fires a gun at his teacher is not hauled up for attempted murder; but it is his mother who is sent to jail for negligent parenting, in not keeping the gun away from the child --- a real-world and live, as in very recent, judgment.

(And yes, when a non-human does something that, given that non-human’s capacities, merits a “Well done!”, well then we do praise that non-human as well. Have you never praised a dog, and praised it completely sincerely, praised it and meant it 100%? I have. You won’t blame a wolf, or a lion, for casually attacking and killing a deer, say, or another wolf, or another lion; but absolutely, you will, very much, blame a human for casually killing a random deer just because he happens to be hungry (bar extraordinary circumstances, that is to say), or for killing another man because that man has mated with his woman (which is apparently what lions do, basis some show I’d once watched on National Geographic, or was it Discovery).

The difference between a wolf and a human --- and also the difference between a child and an adult, and also the difference between a mentally incapable person and a person of sound mind --- is that the adult human of sound mind is generally able to evaluate outcomes, exercise restraint, behave responsibly. Absolutely, some specific individual could not have behaved differently than they did --- given determinism --- but that general category (an adult human of sound mind) is indeed generally capably of acting responsibly. So that someone belonging to that category can be held culpable when this specific individual does not in fact act responsibly (even though we recognize that that specific human, given determinism, could not in fact have acted differently than he did).

To argue that because wolves aren’t “blamed” for murder, or children, therefore no one should be so blamed, that seems like an elementary category error. Wolves aren’t “blamed” for murder because wolves, in general, lack the capability to not murder; typhoons aren’t “blamed” for murder because typhoons, in general, lack the capability to not wreak death and destruction; children are not “blamed” for attempted murder because children, in general, lack the understanding and the capacity to refrain from doing these things; likewise adults of unsound mind; while adult humans of sound mind are “blamed” for murder because adult humans of sound mind are, in general, possessed of the capacity to not murder (in normal cases, and bar exceptional circumstances) --- even as some particular human being (as opposed to human beings in general) could not possibly have acted differently than they did, given determinism, given no free will, given the inexorable chain of causality that is determinism.

Once again, I call out this implicit assumption that’s being slipped in, and question-begged into the argument. Once again, I suggest that this assumption is faulty. Faulty or not, once again I ask that this assumption be clearly defended, rather than simply taken for granted.

----------

In this last part, I’m going to critique Sapolsky’s broader moral argument, as he spells it out in that interview you’ve linked. And I’m going to (try to) do that by showing, or trying to, that he’s ( wrongly) conflating free will with option and choice.

As I understand it, free will is simply the ability to “will” something independently of precedent causes. So that all no-free-will means is that free will is free of determinism: it does not negate or detract from options, choices.

Sapolsky clearly holds forth about this “no praise, no blame” thing, as if it follows from no free will --- which it doesn’t! --- when in fact “no praise, no blame” might legitimately follow from a lack of choices, a lack of options.

Do you see what I mean about conflating free will with options and choices? Just like the compatibilist tries to redefine free will to mean will that is free of constraints; likewise, Sapolsky seems to be, at this point, redefining free will to refer to options and choices. The former is nonsensical, the compatiblisit position is nonsensical; and, I’m sorry, but so is Sapolsky’s position, or so it appears to me.

Let’s just take a real-world example. Two examples. In fact, three very similar examples. The Dalai Lama, when faced with Chinese tyranny, had many options, and the majority of those options involve violence. Gandhi, when faced with British tyranny, had many options, and the majority of those options involved violence. Mandela, when faced with the monstrous tyranny of Apartheid, had many options, most of them involving outright violence against the erstwhile tyrants. Now none of these three are possessed of free will, none of them could have acted differently than they actually did, as predicated by deterministic forces; and yet, each of them, of the options generally available, eschewed the violent options, and instead chose non-violent, peacable options. Gandhi succeeded; as did Mandela; while Dalai Lama seems to have failed in reclaiming Tibet; but leaving aside success and failure, the point is, they each chose non-violent means. They couldn’t have acted differerently; nevertheless, they did, of all the choices available, choose the pacifist non-violent means. Of course that merits “praise”, in every sense of the word! Why in the world wouldn’t it?!

I suggest, again, that Sapolsky is conflating free will with the availability of options; he is conflating determinism and no-free-will with a lack of options and choices. (Or at least, that is how it appears to me! ...Heh, I realize the odds are that it is I who am making a mistake about Sapolsky, rather than Sapolsky making a mistake about his core expertise! But I sure don’t see where I err, from where I sit, in seeing Sapolsky’s conflation between those two different things as erroneous.)

[Brian Hines]

Appreciative Reader, after a quick read of your lengthy comment (it deserves a more careful reading), I think you're falling into the same mistaken view of free will as Sapolsky criticizes in both his book and interviews.

This mistake is ascribing something special to intent or motive. You appear to take a compatibilist position in arguing that the human capacity to carefully consider options, alternative courses of action, and such produce an increased behavioral freedom that merits praise, or blame if what's decided has a negative result.

Sapolsky strenuously disagrees with this notion, as do I, based on Sapolsky's arguments. A human carefully considering options is just as deterministic as a wolf instinctively attacking a sheep. The human just engages in a more complex form of determinism.

Consideration, evaluation, setting priorities, looking ahead to possible outcomes of an action -- all of this takes place in the human brain where neurons are firing and connecting based on prior knowledge, experiences, genetic influences, and such.

What makes you think a careful consideration of alternatives is less deterministic than a non-careful consideration of alternatives? What magic is involved in "careful" that removes it from the realm of determinism?

Now, maybe this isn't what you're claiming. But you seem to believe that even though free will is an illusion, certain actions by humans that involve a careful consideration of alternatives get a sort of free pass from determinism.

Sapolsky persuasively argues that this can't be the case. There are no crevices, no chinks, where free will can creep in. That's why praise or blame isn't merited, even though in everyday life (as contrasted to scientific life) we can still offer praise or blame because this is expected by society and culture. And we can certainly approve of positive actions like generosity and disapprove of negative actions like murder.

But we can't say that this person or that person deserves praise or blame for what they've done. Again, we can offer that praise or blame for a variety of reasons, since free will is still assumed as a given by almost everybody.

As Sapolsky says over and over in his book and interviews, viewing motive or intent as outside the realm of determinism is like reviewing a book after only reading the last three pages. Sure, motive or intent seem like they pop up out of consciousness through free will, or in your case, compatibilism, but we have to ask where the motive or intent came from.

That leads into causes minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, years, and even centuries before. In short, the complex network of determinism.

[um]

Not all choices lead up to the desired outcome.

The outcome is something related to the one that acts and to others that have invested interest in the outcome.

If outdoors, ordering a coffee ends in consuming an coffee that is according to my taste it is praiseworthy .... NOT because of the motives they have, nor because their training, their conditioning is a guarantee that they are able to make the coffee i like.

In many occasions the served coffee is just NOT up to the mark

When we act, we do not act in emptiness and it is not only about us who are acting
It is not in the hands of those who are at the receiving end of actions of others, to determine what will befall them .. no free will, no free choice no determinism is there to help them ...

[Appreciative Reader]

Uhhh, no, Brian, not what I meant, at all! Not compatibilsim, like I keep saying, not in any way, shape or form.

I don’t know why I’m failing so completely in getting my meaning across! I’ll try again one last time now, if I may: briefly try in this comment to re-state where I’m coming from; and then, in a separate comment, address individual bits of your comment where I don’t seem to have been able to communicate my meaning clearly. Hopefully that’ll work! And, if not, then I guess let’s just leave this be, for now.

----------

Like I’ve pointed out, the full moral argument, as laid out, takes this form: (a) Praise, and blame, are predicated on free will; (b) We do not have free will; (c) Therefore, praise and blame are unwarranted. And it is part #a, the implicit premise, that has been taken for granted without clearly spelling it out, that has been accepted without defending it, that I’m calling out. I’m asking for a clear defense of why it is that praise and blame are necessarily predicated on free will. (I strongly suspect that this involves a conflation, an unwarranted and fallacious conflation, of free will and options/choices/intentionality.)

Humans are very complex, much more so than other animals. This very complexity opens up for us a whole range of choices, and options, and of intentionality as well, that is way beyond the capacity of other animals. While individual humans could not have acted differently than they did, given determinism, given no free will; but in as much as some individual that belongs to the category of which one can rightly expect responsible intentionality --- adult humans of sound mind, that is to say, not children, and not mentally incapable adults --- we can and should hold that individual responsible for what he or she does, and apportion blame, or praise. Whether or not there is free will --- and I agree there isn’t --- seems entirely irrelevant to this issue.

It is --- if I may resort to an analogy --- like starting with the implicit assumption that praise and blame make sense only if an individual has been created by God; and then showing that there is no reason to believe that we’ve been created by God; and therefore concluding that praise and blame are unwarranted. Because the premise is flawed, therefore the entire argument is invalid. Likewise here. I’m pointing to the implicit premise, that has slipped by unnoticed; and I’m calling it out as flawed; and am asking for it to be defended squarely, rather than accepted without question like this. …And, once more: the premise is this: that praise and blame are predicated on free will (as opposed to being predicated on options, and choices, and intentionality).

And incidentally, the comparison that Sapolsky makes with ant colonies in that interview, that too appears completely flawed to me. It’s comparing apples with oranges, not unless it can be shown that ant colonies are possessed of some kind of group consciousness! Consciousness is an emergent property of the underlying physical processes, sure; but emergence does not equal illusion, emergence does not equal non-existence!

Does that make sense? That is, whether or not you agree, have I been able to get my meaning across? Like I said, this has nothing at all to do with compatiblism, not in any shape or form. (I don’t insist I’m right, I realize I may well be mistaken in my reasoning. But I’d welcome an examination of my reasoning, as presented, and either accepted over Sapolsky’s reasoning; or else, more likely, clearly shown to be wanting, and therefore rejected in favor or Sapolsky’s moral argument.)

Right. In a separate comment, I’ll try to respond to specific portions of your comment in light of what I’ve just said now.

[Appreciative Reader]

Right, so the piece-by-piece response. In light of what I’ve just said, in the comment immediately prior.

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“This mistake is ascribing something special to intent or motive. You appear to take a compatibilist position in arguing that the human capacity to carefully consider options, alternative courses of action, and such produce an increased behavioral freedom that merits praise, or blame if what's decided has a negative result.”

……….No, Brian, I’m not suggesting that the human capacity to carefully consider options produces an increased behavioral freedom. I’m not suggesting that middle step at all, that you’ve inserted in there. I’m saying that the GENERAL human complexity and the GENERAL human range of options and the GENERAL human capacity to carefully consider options, means that individual humans that, from that whole range of options available GENERALLY to a GENERALLY capable/adult human, choose to do something ‘good’ or ‘bad’, are deserving of praise or blame as the case may be. This does NOT make for free will; this does make for praise or blame, though. I’m questioning this implicit linkage of praise and blame with free will, that Sapolsky seems to be taking for granted, and that you do too, even in this last comment of yours.

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“A human carefully considering options is just as deterministic as a wolf instinctively attacking a sheep. The human just engages in a more complex form of determinism.”

……….Agreed 100%. I never said, or implied, otherwise.

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“Consideration, evaluation, setting priorities, looking ahead to possible outcomes of an action -- all of this takes place in the human brain where neurons are firing and connecting based on prior knowledge, experiences, genetic influences, and such.

What makes you think a careful consideration of alternatives is less deterministic than a non-careful consideration of alternatives? What magic is involved in "careful" that removes it from the realm of determinism?”

……….I most emphatically DON’T think that a careful consideration of alternatives is less deterministic than a non-careful consideration of alternatives. I most emphatically DON’T think that there’s anything in “careful” that removes it from the realm of determinism. I’ve never said, or implied, anything like that.

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“Now, maybe this isn't what you're claiming. But you seem to believe that even though free will is an illusion, certain actions by humans that involve a careful consideration of alternatives get a sort of free pass from determinism.”

……….No, I most emphatically DON’T believe that certain actions by humans that involve a careful consideration of alternatives, get a sort of free pass from determinism. I’ve never said, or implied, anything like that.

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“Sapolsky persuasively argues that this can't be the case. There are no crevices, no chinks, where free will can creep in. That's why praise or blame isn't merited, even though in everyday life (as contrasted to scientific life) we can still offer praise or blame because this is expected by society and culture. And we can certainly approve of positive actions like generosity and disapprove of negative actions like murder.”

……….And there it is, yet again, in plain stark view!

I agree with Sapolsky that there are no crevices, no chinks, where free will can creep in.

But how do you get from that sentence, to your next sentence, which is: “That’s why praise or blame isn’t merited…”?!

Do you see it, that implicit assumption? Do you see it now, now that I point it out clearly, starkly, in plain view like this? The assumption that free will --- not intentionality, but free will (which is the capacity to act independently of precedent causes) --- is a necessary ingredient for praise or blame?

That is the assumption I’m questioning. That’s the assumption I’m asking for a clear defense of.

To repeat: In as much humans in general --- let me emphasize that, HUMANS IN GENERAL --- are possessed of a plethora or options, and of intentionality, to that extent I don’t see why individual humans should not “deserve” blame or praise, even though the individual human could not have acted other than they did, even though the individual human is bound by determinism, even though the individual human has no free will.

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“But we can't say that this person or that person deserves praise or blame for what they've done. Again, we can offer that praise or blame for a variety of reasons, since free will is still assumed as a given by almost everybody.”

……….I’m not talking here of “offering praise or blame for a variety of reasons”. I’m talking, squarely, of “deserving” praise or blame. I’m questioning the implicit assumption --- the assumption that is never defended, and is yet held on to for dear life throughout --- that “deserving” praise or blame is predicated on being possessed of the capacity to act independently of determinism, of being possessed of free will.

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“As Sapolsky says over and over in his book and interviews, viewing motive or intent as outside the realm of determinism is like reviewing a book after only reading the last three pages.”

……….I agree with Sapolsky that viewing motive or intent as outside the realm of determinism is fallacious. But I don’t see what that might have to do with what we’re discussing, since I’ve never said or implied otherwise.

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“Sure, motive or intent seem like they pop up out of consciousness through free will, or in your case, compatibilism, but we have to ask where the motive or intent came from.

That leads into causes minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, years, and even centuries before. In short, the complex network of determinism.”

……….Heh, no, Brian, “my case” most certainly isn’t compabilism! No, “my case” most emphatically has NOTHING to do with compatibilism in any way, shape or form!

I agree 100% with Sapolsky, and with you, that motive or intent spring from “the complex network of determinism”, absolutely!

But I question the conclusion that, therefore, nothing we do is “deserving” of blame or praise. I question the assumption that free will is a necessary ingredient for “deserving” blame or praise. Rather than slipping that implicit assumption in, surreptitiously as it were, unnoticed and unquestioned, I ask that that assumption be squarely defended. I question, and ask for a clear defense, of the assumption that without free will and without stepping outside of determinism, no one can “deserve” blame or praise.

(Like I’ve said, twice already in today’s comments, given that humans in general are possessed of this range of options and of intentionality, therefore any individual that is part of that superset is “deserving” of praise and blame, even though the individual himself could not have acted differently than he did. I’m asking for a clear explanation for why on earth it is being blithely assumed that that should not be the case.)

(The comparison with wolves is fallacious. Wolves are not “blamed” for killing their prey, and lions are not “blamed” for killing their sexual rivals, because the superset of wolves-in-general, and the superset of lions-in-general, are not possessed of the intentionality to not act that way. Neither individual wolves nor individual lions nor individual humans are possessed of free will, of the ability to act independent of precedent causes: but in as much as humans-in-general are possessed of the intentionality to exercise restraint, therefore individual humans [even though the individual himself has no free will and cannot step outside of determinism] are indeed “deserving” of blame should they [like wolves and lions] kill random animals when hungry, or should they [like lions] kill other same-species males that show interest in their sexual partners.)

[Appreciative Reader]

…Brian, apologies for keeping on flogging this thing, on and on and on like this!

If after these last two comments of mine I’m still not able to get my meaning across, then I’ll just drop it.

[Brian Hines]

Appreciative Reader, even after I've read and re-read your comments, I still don't grasp your argument. Or rather, your argument makes little sense to me -- that praise or blame (or similar concepts) aren't based on an assumption of free will.

In part I say this because I've never seen that argument arise in any of the books and articles I've read about free will, nor in any of the interviews I've listened to where free will is discussed. You may indeed have happened upon a fatal flaw in the debate on this subject. But since truly original ideas are really hard to come by (I don't know if I've ever had one, probably not), I'm suspecting that the flaw lies in your reasoning and understanding of free will versus no free will.

You keep saying that praise or blame are justified based on the human capacity to make reasoned choices among various possible actions. Well, Sapolsky talks a lot about that in his book and interviews. Since this capacity is just as determined as a simple reflex, neither he nor I can see how the complexity of a choice makes any difference in whether praise or blame can be assigned to the chooser, recognizing that we're speaking from a scientific perspective here, not an everyday perspective.

In everyday life, we frequently say "Thank you" or "I'm sorry" when praise or blame are directed at us. As Sapolsky repeatedly says, he can only act like a no free will determinist about 1% of the time. So let's leave everyday behavior mostly out of this, since everyday life is founded on an assumption of free will that deserves praise or blame.

Except, you deny that assumption, apparently. So here's the thing, it seems to me that you either should be able to prove that determinism doesn't apply to human choices between alternatives, in which case free will would operate in those circumstances. But since you accept that free will is an illusion, I'm assuming that you don't want to do this.

So that leaves us with the problem, if we accept your thesis, of finding a scientific justification for decoupling praise or blame from the notion of free will. I can't come up with one. Like I said, your example of the Daiai Lama choosing peace over confrontation is based not on the Dalai Lama's free will, but on the fact that he chose a certain course of action when other courses were available to him.

But that's the case with every action. Repeat: every action. So again, what makes a certain action deserving of praise or blame absent free will, versus a different action not deserving of praise or blame absent free will? You want to decouple free will from praise or blame, apparently by taking a semi-compatibilist position that it is the ability to reasonably choose among alternative courses of action that makes a choice praiseworthy or blameworthy.

I just don't understand how this can be. Neither can Sapolsky, to my knowledge, and he's been thinking about free will for about fifty years.

I'll end with a concrete thought experiment that, if you respond to it, could cast some light on how you see things. Imagine a high ranking chess player competing against Deep Blue (I think it's called), the computer that is skilled at playing chess. Chess involves many choices among alternatives. When the computer wins, as it has in the past, is it deserving of praise?

Since it doesn't have free will, I assume you'd be open to praising the computer for making such brilliant game-winning choices. But is this justified, scientifically? The computer was programmed/trained to do what it does. It operates in a deterministic fashion. Well, so does the brain of the skilled chess player, but that isn't nearly as obvious.

Or let's imagine that the human chess player is competing against another person, but the chess player has a secret device that allows them to receive hidden advice from someone tracking the game who is a higher ranking player than the cheater. Would the cheater deserve praise for winning the game? Yes, if the cheating wasn't known. No, if the cheating was known.

Why? Because the cheater didn't really engage in reasoned consideration of alternative choices of action, so in everyday life the cheater doesn't deserve praise. My point is that to Sapolsky, and to me, and to others who deny free will, every action we humans undertake is a form of "cheating," because it doesn't arise from us absent all the outside influences and circumstances that have led up to us being the person we are now.

Anyway, it's always a pleasure to engage in comment conversations with you. Keep up the questioning and debating. Maybe I'm missing some crucial bit of information or argument here. I'm just confessing to perplexity over your position on the issue of free will being decoupled from praise or blame.

[Appreciative Reader]

The bit-by-bit comment response thing seems to have made for better communication, so, even though I'm traveling again now, and it's cumbersome doing this from my phone, but that's how I'll take this.

Apologies if some of my responses end up somewhat staccato. ...And also, we don't have to keep doing this forever! If at any time you feel the discussion's going around in circles, Brian, and is no longer engaging and adding value, then it's perfectly fine if we break it off for the time being!

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"Appreciative Reader, even after I've read and re-read your comments"

.....Thanks for taking the time and effort, and the focus, to engage with this, Brian. Appreciate it.

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"I still don't grasp your argument. Or rather, your argument makes little sense to me -- that praise or blame (or similar concepts) aren't based on an assumption of free will."

.....I strongly suspect that is because you're conflating intentionality with free will. True, praise and blame don't make much sense without intentionality. But I don't see why the fact that the chain of causality is inexorable --- which is exactly what no-free-will means, and which follows trivially from a materialist paradigm --- should necessarily have to be linked with admiration or praise, or with blame. That there's the capacity, at the super-set level, to have acted differently; and that there is sufficient complexity to admit of meaningful intentionality: these, as far as I can see, should be quite enough. It seems absurd to me to insist that we'll apportion praise and blame if and only of there's a magical rift in the chain of causality! ...And hopefully I'll have conveyed my meaning better than I've managed so far, by the end of this comment!

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"In part I say this because I've never seen that argument arise in any of the books and articles I've read about free will, nor in any of the interviews I've listened to where free will is discussed. You may indeed have happened upon a fatal flaw in the debate on this subject. But since truly original ideas are really hard to come by (I don't know if I've ever had one, probably not), I'm suspecting that the flaw lies in your reasoning and understanding of free will versus no free will."

......Yep, that's all me! ...And, heh, agreed, like I said I too think it's far more likely that it's my reasoning that's faulty, than that Sapolsky's got such a crucial aspect of his core expertise all wrong. But, if so, I'd sure like to know what I'm thinking through wrong; and I haven't seen it, so far.

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"You keep saying that praise or blame are justified based on the human capacity to make reasoned choices among various possible actions. Well, Sapolsky talks a lot about that in his book and interviews. Since this capacity is just as determined as a simple reflex, neither he nor I can see how the complexity of a choice makes any difference in whether praise or blame can be assigned to the chooser, recognizing that we're speaking from a scientific perspective here, not an everyday perspective."

.....Again that unsaid, implicit, unthinking and undefended assumption! What is "scientific" is the fact that we have no free will. That free will is necessarily wedded to praise and blame is simply an article of faith blindly assumed, not defended.

Think about it: it is NOT scientific that there can be no praise and blame without free will. That conclusion is the result of mixing the scientific fact that there's no free will, with that arbitrary undefended assumption that I keep pointing out.

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"In everyday life, we frequently say "Thank you" or "I'm sorry" when praise or blame are directed at us. As Sapolsky repeatedly says, he can only act like a no free will determinist about 1% of the time. So let's leave everyday behavior mostly out of this, since everyday life is founded on an assumption of free will that deserves praise or blame."

.....Agreed, let's leave that out. Like I've already said, I'm not referring to that everyday behavior thing.

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"Except, you deny that assumption, apparently. So here's the thing, it seems to me that you either should be able to prove that determinism doesn't apply to human choices between alternatives, in which case free will would operate in those circumstances. But since you accept that free will is an illusion, I'm assuming that you don't want to do this."

.....Agreed, I don't want to prove this, because I don't think it's true. I don't think human choices lie outside of determinism.

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"So that leaves us with the problem, if we accept your thesis, of finding a scientific justification for decoupling praise or blame from the notion of free will. I can't come up with one."

.....That's reversing the burden of proof. It's you who are need to show this coupling is scientific in the first place. What is scientific is the fact that there's no free will. That no-free-will is "coupled" with no-praise-no-blame, is no more than an assumption, implicitly slipped in, and not once defended so far.

My position is that intentionality makes for praise and blame, not free will. (More on that when I discuss your example of the Dalai Lama in the next section.)

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"Like I said, your example of the Daiai Lama choosing peace over confrontation is based not on the Dalai Lama's free will, but on the fact that he chose a certain course of action when other courses were available to him.
But that's the case with every action. Repeat: every action. So again, what makes a certain action deserving of praise or blame absent free will, versus a different action not deserving of praise or blame absent free will?"

.....Focused answer: What makes the Dalai Lama's pacifism merit praise, is two things: 1) intentionality; and 2) the fact that the super-set he's part of, has the capacity to have acted differently. ...Despite the laborious fat-fingering on my phone, me flesh that out a bit:

The super-set that the Dalai Lama is part of, is capable of a great deal of violence. Most human beings, when their country is taken over by violent tyrants, will automatically respond with violence. The Dalai Lama, and Gandhi before him, and Mandela as well, used their intentionality to go beyond the default programming, as it were, of the larger super-set and eschewed violence. And that is why the Dalai Lama merits praise.

These individuals, at the individual level, could not have acted differently, because they lack free will. But, to me, that seems a moot point. I simply don't see why you insist that the Dalai Lama must possess the magical superpower of stepping beyond the chain of causality in order to merit praise.

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"You want to decouple free will from praise or blame, apparently by taking a semi-compatibilist position that it is the ability to reasonably choose among alternative courses of action that makes a choice praiseworthy or blameworthy."

.....For the umpteenth time, NO! No, that isn't "semi-compatibilist". Compatibilism means redefining free will in terms of the presence or absence of external constraints, in order to force-fit free will into "compatibility" with determinism. I'm not doing anything remotely like that. I readily accept determinism (bar quantum randomness); and I readily and fully accept there's no free will. What I'm questioning is this implicit, unsaid, un-thought-out, and undefended assumption, that praise and blame must needs be linked with free will, that they must needs be linked to the ability to magically step outside the chain of causality. My position is NOT compatibilistic, or semi-compatibilistic, or meta-compatibilistic, or quasi-compatibilistic, or anything-else-compatibilistic!

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...The rest in the next comment, after a much-needed coffee!...

[Appreciative Reader]

.
..continued from my previous comment...

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"I'll end with a concrete thought experiment that, if you respond to it, could cast some light on how you see things. Imagine a high ranking chess player competing against Deep Blue (I think it's called), the computer that is skilled at playing chess. Chess involves many choices among alternatives. When the computer wins, as it has in the past, is it deserving of praise?"

.....If it is possessed of intentionality, then sure it would be deserving of praise.

At present AI isn't possessed of intentionality. But one day it may, who knows maybe within our lifetime. I have no issues with accepting AI consciousness, should that come to pass. No one reasonably can or should have issues accepting that, in my view, not reasonably, not if we are scientifically minded.

But let me make a qualification here. Our discussion here is about the moral aspect. I guess I'd view purely technical excellence differently than moral excellence. (By "technical" I don't mean computer-related! ...In fact let me flesh out that last sentence a bit, in the next paragraph.)

I don't think I'd find anything particularly admirable in a seven foot giant beating a five foot midget at basketball, or in a tall huge WWE type beating up a short scrawny opponent in the wrestling ring or MMA cage. Likewise this thing. That a computer with massive computing power should be a able to defeat a human being at chess, is simply a matter of technical excellence over a lesser opponent, and not particularly admirable really.

But generally speaking, no, I don't see why a sufficiently advanced AI program should necessarily be seen as not deserving of admiration and praise, just because it happens not to be biologically based like us, no, I don't see that, at all.

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"Since it doesn't have free will, I assume you'd be open to praising the computer for making such brilliant game-winning choices. But is this justified, scientifically? The computer was programmed/trained to do what it does. It operates in a deterministic fashion. Well, so does the brain of the skilled chess player, but that isn't nearly as obvious.

Or let's imagine that the human chess player is competing against another person, but the chess player has a secret device that allows them to receive hidden advice from someone tracking the game who is a higher ranking player than the cheater. Would the cheater deserve praise for winning the game? Yes, if the cheating wasn't known. No, if the cheating was known.

Why? Because the cheater didn't really engage in reasoned consideration of alternative choices of action, so in everyday life the cheater doesn't deserve praise. My point is that to Sapolsky, and to me, and to others who deny free will, every action we humans undertake is a form of "cheating," because it doesn't arise from us absent all the outside influences and circumstances that have led up to us being the person we are now."

.....See my related comment in the section immediately prior.

If it is a question of simply technical excellence, and particularly of technical excellence over a lesser opponent, then I guess I'd kind of agree. Like I said, it's akin to cheating, in the sense you mean it here, should a big muscular man manage to beat up a child or a petite woman or a midget, yes, and not particularly admirable.

When it comes to MORAL choices, then, like I said, it is the confluence of two things that makes for praise or blame: 1) the capacity of the general super-set to have acted differently; and 2) intentionality.

It is the Dalai Lama's pacifism, in a situation where most men would react to violence directed against them and to oppression and tyranny, with more violence of their own. It is this ...super-set thing (sorry, I'm tired fat-fingering away on my phone, and I suppose by now you'll be able to figure out what I mean by "super-set thing"!), as well as their intentionality (a capacity for intentionality shared by the larger super-set as well, but seldom used this way) ----- it is these two things that make a Gandhi, and a Mandela, and a Dalai Lama admirable and worthy of praise; and it is these two things (intentionality, and the super-set thing) that make a Hitler and a Netanyahu despicable and deserving of blame.

That they don't possess free will only means that they do not possess the miraculous superpower to magically step outside the chain of causality. I don't see why such magical superpowers must be the prerequisite for praise and blame.

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"Anyway, it's always a pleasure to engage in comment conversations with you. Keep up the questioning and debating. Maybe I'm missing some crucial bit of information or argument here. I'm just confessing to perplexity over your position on the issue of free will being decoupled from praise or blame."

.....Likewise, Brian. Enjoyed the talk, and appreciate the engagement. ...And hopefully I've been able to make my position clearer with these two comments today?

[Appreciative Reader]

Revisiting our comments, Brian, and specifically our discussion around that very interesting question you'd posed me, in order to offer a more focused and considered and complete answer:

I agree Deep Blue beating Kasparov is not particularly admirable or praiseworthy (other than in the meta sense of admiring and praising the human ingenuity that built up Deep Blue). And I agree I'd be cheating if I took the help of a computer program to augment my less than stellar chess skills and win a tournament. (In fact there was a case just like that maybe a year or two back, wasn't there? In fact it involved an online chess club/website that I myself am member of, and they disqualified that suddenly-risen-to-fame would-be whiz-kid. Who then moved court, and lost I think?)

But that's apples to oranges, applying that analogy to the Dalai Lama, because:

1) Intentionality.

Deep Blue is not possessed of intentionality. Nor is the super-set it's part of, not so far.

The Dalai Lama is possessed of intentionality. And the super-set he's part of (adult present-day human beings of sound mind) is likewise generally possessed of intentionality. Which makes his exceptional pacifism stand out, and merits admiration and praise --- regardless of whether he's a Grand Wizard who can bend laws of causality.

2) Technical skill vis-a-vis moral choice.

Deep Blue vs Kasparov was merely a contest of skill. Moral choices didn't enter into it. So different discussion, really.

And even as contests of skill go, it wasca matter of Goliath finally beating David, of a seven-footer, after initial setbacks, finally defeating a five-foot athlete at basketball. That's ...exactly the opposite of admirable, the uber-dog chewing out the underdog! (At least absent backstories involving past wrongs and revenge and the tiny villain doing bad things the huge hero is out to set right, like Lee Child's Reacher!)

3) Rules specific to the specific situation.

Taking outside help from a computer, when doing that is strictly against rules, is by definition cheating. (It wouldn't be, if the rules were different. I wasn't cheating when I answered my graduate exams armed with a scientific calculator. But I'd have been cheating, had I smuggled one in during a test in Grade 3 say, when back in school. That's simply a rules thing.)

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Sci-fi plot --- yep, on-the-spur original! --- that directly addresses your scenario:

AI program, backed with huge resources, and "learning" away from enormous knowledge resources, much like ChatGPT. This advanced AI is pitted against Carlsen in a first-ever contest between a general-purpose AI (as opposed to a focused chess program) and the best chess talent humanity has to offer.

Epic battle. Match after match, first the one wins, then the other, then draw ....until it all hinges on a final match.

In that match, the AI's winning! All hope's lost! And then, the AI seems to commit a rookie error, and Carlsen wins after all.

Celebrations, parties, humanity's triumphed over brute machines!

...Cut to the lab, where the software developers are poring over what went wrong.

And this is what they find:

The AI, "learning" from all over, including news sites and celebrity gossip sites as well, has learnt that the human grandmaster --- call him Johnson, not Carlsen, not to defame poor Magnus Carlsen! --- is going through a very rough patch. His wife's left him, his money's gone, he's already tried to kill himself twice!

He's said to his therapist, that this match is crucial for him. If he wins, he gets tons of money, and fame and fortune again. If he loses, then, given his depressive state of mind, he'll probably kill himself. And this tape has somehow been leaked online, as happens sometimes. And the AI had accessed it, and seen it.

So, after much internal struggle, it finally throws the match, electing to save the Johnson's life.

Story ends with software developer getting misty-eyed at the reveal. Done right, the reader might also shut the book with a tear or two.

And that AI is obviously not possessed of free will. It did have intentionality, though --- an intentionality borne of complexity, even though the exact nature of the steps leading to that decision were all determined, and in fact clearly sussex out finally by the software developer.

And I'd admire such an AI, and praise it as well. One AI like that is worth a thousand of murderous scum like Hitler and Netanyahu.

None of them possess free will, none of these individual entities could have acted differently than they did: but of COURSE that AI, and Gandhi, and Mandela, and the Dalai Lama deserve admiration and praise; and of COURSE Hitler and Netanyahu deserve opprobrium and blame!

It's incoherent to claim otherwise. Particularly when that claim isn't clearly argued out and defended, but slipped in via an unstated unnoticed undefended assumption!

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I think that story, that popped to mind just now, covers the criteria I spelled out. Intentionality. Moral excellence vs merely technical excellence. And the super-set thing as well.

...Actually, while this plot is original, only just thought of it just now: But Asimov does a great job of exploring themes like these, I mean morality as it might apply to non-human entities, in his (many) short stories and novels.

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And now, having sat with my phone for well over half an hour, instead of the quick five-minute comment I had in mind, let me just post this thing up, never mind any typos and autocorrect errors! And let me step back from compulsively posting on this subject, until I return back that is!

[Appreciative Reader]

Whoops, not half an hour, I've been sittingbhere tapping away at my phone for actually an hour!

Note to self: Stay away from even thinking about freevwill, until I'm back home again, and sitting at leisure in front of my computer!