I'm continuing to enjoy Robert Sapolsky's book Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will, which I first wrote about a few days ago. The book is getting a lot of publicity, way more than any other book on this subject so far as I can tell.
Before I share what I said about the illusion of free will on my HinesSight blog yesterday, here's more from Sapolsky -- quotes from the end of his chapter "Where Does Intent Come From?"
In the first chapter, I wrote about what is needed to prove free will, and this chapter has added details to that demand: show me that the thing a neuron just did in someone's brain was unaffected by any of these preceding factors -- by the goings-on in the eighty billion neurons surrounding it, by any of the infinite number of combinations of hormone levels percolated that morning, by any of the countless types of childhoods and fetal environments were experienced, by any of the two to the four millionth power different genomes that neuron contains, multiplied by the nearly as large range of epigenetic orchestrations possible. Et cetera. All out of your control.
...Why did that moment just occur? "Because of what came before it." Then why did that moment just occur? "Because of what came before that," forever isn't absurd and is, instead, how the universe works. The absurdity amid this seamlessness is to think that we have free will and that it exists because at some point, the state of the world (or of the frontal cortex or neuron or molecule of serotonin...) that "came before that" happened out of thin air.
In order to prove there's free will, you have to show that some behavior just happened out of thin air in the sense of considering all these biological precursors. It may be possible to sidestep that with some subtle philosophical arguments, but you can't with anything known to science.
And here's what I said in my HinesSight post yesterday, I don't believe in free will. Here's why. I left out a quotation from Sapolsky's book that I included in my first post about it.
Today the monthly Salon discussion group that my wife and I are part of spent quite a bit of time talking about free will.
This is one of my favorite subjects, for after pondering quite a few books about free will, or the lack thereof, I'm highly confident that free will is an illusion.
I can't recall exactly how our group started conversing about it, but for sure I spurred our conversation by saying that I've started reading Robert M. Sapolsky's terrific book, Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will.
To give you a feel for his general view of free will, here's an eight-minute interview featuring Sapolsky, a Stanford University professor of biology, of neurology and neurological sciences, and of neurosurgery.
I was worried that my passion for this subject wouldn't be shared by other members of the discussion group. I was wrong. We had a really interesting discussion of free will in which some people agreed with me that we don't possess it, and others presented reasons why they think we do.
Since I'm writing this blog post, not them, I'm going to focus on briefly relating some of my arguments for why free will doesn't exist. These aren't original, obviously. They flow from the books I've read by people arguing that free will is an illusion.
(1) Humans are part of the natural world. We are animals. Animals with powerful brains, to be sure, but animals. If a grizzly bear attacks someone, we don't consider that the bear had the free will to do otherwise. We just say, it was doing what bears do. So what makes us think that we stand apart from the natural world by possessing some sort of free will magic in our brain?
(2) The core argument against free will is simple. Everything about us, and the rest of the world, is determined. That's why Sapolsky's book has that title, Determined. Sure, we make choices. So do bears. And sea slugs. Those choices, those intentions, don't spring out of nowhere. They arise out of the goings-on in our brain, which is amazingly complex, yet still determined by causes and effects that range from a few seconds ago, to the moment of our birth, and even beyond given cultural and genetic influences on us.
(3) Recall something you've done that you regret. That's easy for me. Probably is for you also. We all have regrets. Often, or usually, that regret is made more painful by believing that we could have acted differently. But consider this. If every atom in your brain and outside world were in exactly the same condition as it was when you acted the first time, you'd do exactly what you did again. No doubt about it. Free will assumes that we have a choice to act differently. That can't be true if nothing has changed from when we acted initially.
(4) But as Sapolsky says in the video above, change does happen. All the time. Life and our world as a whole is nothing but change. People change. Animals change. Rocks change. Plants change. Free will, since it doesn't exist, can't change anything. Yet circumstances change. Every thought we have, every feeling we have, every action we take, all that changes us. So there's no fatalism involved in giving up a belief in free will. In fact, not believing in free will opens us to the reality that change can occur for countless reasons. Life is a never-ending series of surprises caused by determinism.
(5) Believing in free will fosters judgmentalism. We see someone in an unfortunate situation and think, "It's their fault." Giving up a belief in free will leads to a realization that, as strange as this may sound, no one is deserving of praise or blame. They're just doing what was determined that they do. So are we. Everybody is. Sure, society is justified in imprisoning dangerous people. But not to punish them. To protect others. And to change the prisoner for the better, if this is possible.
(6) There's no reason to think that people would go wild and crazy if they didn't believe in free will. Animals don't believe in free will, yet a wolf pack, herd of deer, school of fish, or flock of birds do just fine without such a belief. Us human animals have a strong sense of community and social cohesion. We generally want to get along with our fellow humans, notwithstanding our political, religious, and other sorts of divisions. Morality flows from a much deeper source than free will. It is embedded in our being thanks to evolution.
This morning I emailed a link to my HinesSight post to the members of our discussion group. After sharing the link, I added some personal observations.
In the opinion piece of the Los Angeles Times (Oct. 22, 2023) John Martin Fischer a professor of philosophy at UC Riverside writes “Some scientists (referring here to Sapolsky’s book) say we don’t have free will. As a philosopher I say, of course we do.”
He makes the usual assumptions such as: “Consider, as a simple example, my decision to sit down at my computer to write these sentences. Yes, my past and the laws of nature may have crucially led me here. But I did so also because of deliberation. I weighed the pros for writing against the cons and chose to do it. It wasn’t like a sneeze [involuntary]; it was a process that involved reasoning. Determinism helps explain why I started typing, but it does not in itself rule out my free will.”
He goes on to talk about moral responsibility, how some people deserve blame and resent-ment, much as others deserve praise and gratitude and that determinism means letting immor-al people off the hook and conversely not praising good actions.
He does not seem to realise or accept that our choices and deliberations carry the same weight and responsibility as the concept of free will (see Brian’s point 2 on choices and point 6 on morality). Also, Fisher does not mention the core belief of free will – something that has the notional capacity or ability to choose between different possible courses of action unimpeded. Traditionally, ‘unimpeded’ has religious connotations and is synonymous with having a soul or spirit that is uninfluenced by the flesh (nature).
Posted by: Ron E. | October 23, 2023 at 02:36 AM
What is this endless lament about will all about??
Who has the power to make appear what he wills>
Who is able to sleep at will?
Who is able to change his mood at will?
Who is able to change the fow of thoughts at will?
Who is able to change the weather at will?
Who is able to bypass the laws of nature?
who is able to bypass his past
who is able to by pass his character
Who is able to by pass his conditioning?
Who is able to change anything that was not created by himself?
Who is able to create at will?
Posted by: um | October 23, 2023 at 04:05 AM
The words appear before me, and I do not know how they came
The mood appeared before me and I did no from where and how
I can make coffee, lift the cup and drink the coffee, but i do not know how the "I" does that
Would any body live his life the way he does as he had will to change, himself and the world he lives in?
Would the poor Gazan people waiting to be killed and injured stay in Gaza if they had free will?
Would they not teleport themselves at will to an luxurious Disney Kibbutz?
What will for heavens sake.?!
What is it that people that go on to discuss it are after for themselves and others?
What is that they want?
Life is a mistery
what FREEDOM of use?!
Posted by: um | October 23, 2023 at 05:40 AM
Watched the video. Kind of ...obvious? Same old, same old? ...But then I suppose that's only because we've already covered this ground, many times, on here. In general terms, it's interesting enough, sure.
At the end of the short video, up pops the full 1½ hour interview, thanks to YT algo. I haven't watched it yet, but I've bookmarked it for later on, when I'm free. Here's the link for the full thing: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DtmwtjOoSYU
Posted by: Appreciative Reader | October 23, 2023 at 06:30 AM
Not to beat to death my main objection to this sort of thinking, that I've articulated more than once, but I can't help pointing out, in one more comment here, that we seem to conflating free will with agency. ...That there's no free will is very easily deduced directly, top-down, from a materialist paradigm; and in as much as science has, so far, revealed to us a materialistic universe, therefore, absent evidence to the contrary, we can take it that there's no free will. That's easily understood, beginning to end, in one single sentence. We probably don't need an entire book to argue that obvious, commonsense position. (To be clear, I'm AGREEING, as I always have, that there's no free will.) ...Agency, however? That's a different thing altogether, and it makes no sense to conflate that with free will. ...I suppose, let me explain more clearly what I mean:
There was that example, that metaphor, in a previous post, quoting Breer I think (or was it someone else?), of a boat floating in the river or the sea. Some guy in a boat has come and rammed your boat, and you're furious with the guy. But then you see that the boat is simply floating there, and the winds pulled it to your boat, or maybe a jammed gear on that empty boat did. You no longer have any call to get upset or angry or whatever. ...Well, here's what I thought of when I read that thing then, except I didn't spell it out at that time. Instead of simply a dumb boat, think of a highly evolved AI-driven self-driving boat. ...Let me further spell that out:
We already have these ChatGPT thingies, where the developers of the AI can themselves not figure out exactly how and why it does some of the things it does. That is, in principle they know why. Also, at least at this point in time, if they were to throw all their resources at one particular answer from ChatGPT, then no doubt they'd be able to find out, in practice as well, exactly how and why. But in actuality, given resource constraints, why ChatGPT gives certain specific answers, is something that is de facto something even the developers can't figure out, really. Or so I remember hearing one of them say, I forget who exactly, Sam Altman maybe, or whoever it was.
So, think of a far more advanced AI system, maybe twenty or thirty years hence. Made all the more inscrutable (to us humans) by the fact that no doubt by that time AI will have started improving itself, "evolving" that is to say. (That has so far not happened. While AI "learns", but so far tweaks in the programming parameters are fed in by the developers and programmers. But it's surely only a matter of time, and not too much time at that, before self-correcting AI is unleashed, and the exponential leaps in complexity that that implies.)
Well, such a boat, powered by an incredibly sophisticated AI, floating on the river, can indeed be judged. Should these boats not have any of these rules hardwired into them, then certainly, one that necessarily avoids all damage to other boats, can be thought of as more "virtuous" than another boat that only cares about getting from point A to point B, and the "collateral damage" be damned. Much like us humans, such boats can indeed be "judged" to be either saintly, or normal-human-good, or amoral, or normal-human-bad, or completely psychotic and evil. Absolutely we can judge such programs, such boats, as such, why not.
And that would be an example of agency, but not of free will. There'd be no free will on those boats, for exactly the reasons Sapolsky argues. Or the top-down obvious reasoning directly from materialism that I invoked (and have presented before this, as well). Nevertheless, as opposed to simply a mechanical boat, an sophisticated-AI-powered boat would indeed be possessed of agency, by virtue of the sheer complexity of it.
Which, it seems to me, is exactly how it is with us humans. We don't have free will, most emphatically (and entirely obviously). But we are, indeed, possessed of agency.
(And of course, it does make sense to "praise" a morally superior AI-enabled boat, and a morally superior human being; and to "blame" an evil and malignant AI-boat or human being. That is, while it is great not to ever get angry or agitated, sure; and in any case it makes sense to temper our instinct for vengeance, if only in consideration for what that does to us; but it does make sense to admire and prefer --- yes, and "praise" --- a morally 'better' AI-boat or human over a morally inferior one.)
...This conflation of free will with agency, that seems to be repeated time and time again without getting to the root of the issue of this conflation, it ...bugs me, I must say. Either I'm completely mistaken about how I've reasoned this out, and have argued this out (which is quite possible, I'm not for a minute suggesting I'm inerrantly correct on this, except I don't quite see where exactly I err in my reasoning); or else this entire thesis is ...not quite coherent.
Posted by: Appreciative Reader | October 23, 2023 at 07:10 AM
Not too keen on the term ‘determinism’ as it smacks of everything being preordained and that doesn’t’ sit well. Although the reality is, that as we are all programmed through the influences of the cultures and societies we are born into. In that sense, our ensuing thoughts and actions are predetermined. ‘Agency’ does seem better as the term refers to the ‘feeling’ of control – not the control as exhibited by an external agency as in the free will school of thought. But again, with agency, we, our thoughts and actions are the result of our particular backgrounds.
Both have merit. Determinism states that where people have to make a certain decision, they could not have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did. That feels a bit constricting, suggesting that there was only one course of action that the person automatically chooses, whereas in fact, a persons’ choices are boundless and reflect the myriad variables derived from a lifetime’s assemblage of experiences and information.
Agency on the other hand, (in the psychological sense) is to feel that we are in charge and in control of our own lives with the ability to act autonomously and freely. And yes, this feels true but again reflects the result of the baggage of a person’s past with all that that entails. It seems that we cannot escape the influence that our backgrounds have over our present and future thoughts and actions.
As far as ethics and responsibility is concerned, we comprise variable innate natural sensibilities and coupled with our man-made cultural and societal rules and laws, we theoretically, have the basis to make judgements and ethical decisions which benefit ourselves and societies can ideally make.
Posted by: Ron E. | October 23, 2023 at 09:03 AM
The problem with these arguments is the use of the echo chamber to bolster them: People who already believe entirely in these things. Repeating ten opinions is not the same as ten independent sources of intellectual thought.
As pointed out repeatedly earlier, we have relative free will and the universe has a level of in-determinism right along with determinism.
Here is the argument proof:
1. Provided education and encouragement, people have new choices available to them that were not there before, and the influence of other people, hence they can now do what they could not do before. They have greater free will provided externally by their environment, and internally as the result of education and positive influence. Many, many people take advantage of this opportunity and make new choices that further expand their freedom. Others do not. In both cases they have greater free will than they had before. They have, even in a mostly determinate world, relative free will. Give a prisoner good education, options and encouragement, over time the old habits may be replaced with new habits, new choices that person didn't have available or knowledge of before. And the result is freedom to do what they could not do before.
So there is relative free will in terms of the influence of information and the encouragement of others in our social network. Those two causal factors greatly influence how well we use our potential.
To claim there is no free will is to defend the practice of slavery. Many white slave owners argued that slaves could not possibly achieve what whites achieved because they didn't have the capacity. They looked at their slaves and saw them acting like slaves, and concluded, this is all they can do. This was a self-serving and self-fulfilling prophecy, a hateful way of thinking, because slaves were never given the same advantages as others, and did not have the same breadth of education nor choices. However, even so, many slaves self-educated and wrote and spoke brilliantly on the error of whites who made this judgement.
1.b. We have potential within each of us that we are not fully aware of. Therefore for anyone to claim "He could do nothing else" is not the same as claiming "He can do nothing else." The potential within each of us can be awakened through education, influence, new experiences. And then we find we are capable of much more than we might have thought. And we have more choices when we make decisions about what to do next.
What 1 and 1b effectively do is to reduce the utility of arguments of determinism to their rightful purpose: Understanding and encouragement, rather than to judgement and dismissal of those of different views.
Since determinism has been used to excuse racism, and free will has been used to encourage personal growth and development, and investment in rehabilitation, education and providing better environments for others, I question the utility of attempting to prove a strict determinism, since basing that on observation is perpetuating all the evils of the status quo.
Since each of us, under the right conditions, can learn, change and grow, and our decision-making is a great part of that, it can't be said that we have zero free will, since we now act with much greater free will relative to what we had before.
A free person living in a stable nation has much more free will than a prisoner.
2. We can't claim the universe is 100% deterministic because we don't understand or know all of it. It seems, logically, that everything has a cause. We are taught this in spirituality and to a degree in science. But science is not as conclusive simply because it doesn't claim to understand the whole of creation, nor even half of it.
In fact, in every scientific experiment that works to prove the effect of an independent variable, the changes noted are compared to a level of statistically-generated variability based on "chance" or "Random variation"...This is the variation in the environment that cannot yet be explained. In order to prove determinism for a specific variable, a level of in-determinism must first be established. Therefore, in every experiment there is both determinism and a background of in-determinism. Without that background, no effect in the real world can be proven. You need both.
That in-determinism is not acknowledged by the authors cited in the post simply reflects their ignorance of how science actually is conducted. Science lives in the unknown and painstakingly brings parts of the unknown into the known. But determinism presumes all is known. That is false.
To prove a fully deterministic universe requires a closed universe. There is not adequate evidence to conclude this. Since a level of in-determinism must be established to conduct any scientific inquiry, every experiment that establishes background variation in fact provides evidence of that in-determinism (the unkown, what is yet to be measured).
2.b. A popular theory that uses this is Chaos theory. Chaos theory demonstrates that even in an entirely deterministic universe, unpredictable events can and do take place. This is because we cannot measure all variables adequately, and those background variables over time can lead to entirely unpredictable events. Therefore, since prediction accuracy drops away significantly over time, because we don't understand all the variables nor how they interact, there is relatively limited determinism, in terms of it's practical use, and quite a bit of in-determinism in terms of the reality of events.
3. Complex systems. Even assuming determinism, complex systems often produce events that cannot be predicted from prediction based upon their independent variables. Because they cannot be predicted, they fail the single principle proof of determinism, and its use.
The human brain is a complex system, therefore it will continue to generate novel, unpredictable ideas, and actions, and thus open for its user untold options, all with a little creative thought, which on its own naturally arises in many people.
Belief in God is one of those wild-card mechanisms of thought and heart that can and has yielded incredible changes for good in people oppressed and without any visible support or asylum.
Therefore the argument for determinism, which cannot be proven in absolute terms, because of the unknown, and which, even if it were true, cannot accurately predict how each individual person may react and interact, is relatively useless. But when applied to individuals is entirely defeatist.
The entire theory of evolution, which is well-proven, rests on a foundation of random, ie; not entirely understood nor predictable, variation. The universe introduces new in-determinant wild-cards into genetics all the time. The very theory of evolution rests in part on the basis of in-determinism. Therefore, the universe cannot be strictly determinate if Evolution is real, which we know it is.
Meanwhile, as education and good environment result in change and growth of personal free will, the utility of the concept of relative free will is much more practical and useful.
4. In a fully deterministic universe no one is responsible for their actions and no change or improvement is possible. This is the greatest argument against strictly deterministic thinking. People can and do take responsibility, and when they do not and society or family, or conscience reminds them, they can and do make course corrections. Therefore the possibility of exercising that free will is of principle importance.
So, in short, no excuses. But lots of help and encouragement.
Posted by: Spence Tepper | October 23, 2023 at 09:18 AM
Hi Brian:
You wrote:
"Could this help explain why my father, by all accounts from what I’ve been able to learn, was an egotistical selfish asshole? Maybe? Probably?
"Regardless I felt more compassion for my father this morning than I ever have, because viewing him as the product of deterministic forces put him in a different light than how I’ve tended to see him: "
He worked very hard and did the very best he could, and accepted what he was incapable, emotionally, of doing.
He could have done nothing else. Nor you.
But had you understood and accepted him on the spot, when you saw him, and asked to spend more time with him, you may have opened a door to a different man...and there would have been in that moment two different men interacting.
Understanding naturally results in compassion. And meditation, Zen or otherwise, as well as a belief that we are truly all brothers and sisters (certainly genetically, and possibly spiritually, children of One "father") raises our compassion and understanding.
And that increases our own free will. And exercising that, we help others expand theirs.
Posted by: Spence Tepper | October 23, 2023 at 09:29 AM
To those touting "agency," whatever that is, as a replacement for free will, this reminds me of Sapolsky's observation that philosophy may be able to come up with (spurious) arguments in favor of free will, this has no bearing on scientific reality. Agency strikes me as simply another way of arguing for "compatibilism," the weird notion that while free will is an illusion, we nonetheless possess the capacity to make choices if not physically constrained (as in prison) so somehow choosing is compatible with free will.
This sophism is just a way to avoid the plain fact that free will means, obviously, that our will is free -- unconstrained by all the influences Sapolsky describes in his book: prior decisions, other prior experiences, genetics, childhood and prenatal history, cultural influences, and so on. A positive review of Sapolsky's book in Psychology Today speaks about this subject of choice:
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/this-is-america/202310/an-attack-on-free-will
-----------------------------
Free will, Robert Sapolsky (professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University, recipient of a MacArthur Foundation Genius Grant, and the author, among other books, of Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst) reminds us, is usually defined as the ability of the brain to spontaneously generate and consider alternative options, select one, and decide whether to act on it.
Sapolsky considers this claim akin to believing that human beings possess a non-biological essence “bespangled with fairy dust.”
In Determined, Sapolsky maintains that all beliefs, values, and behavior (“the way you became you”) result from the complex, uniquely individualized interactions of genes, brain chemistry, fetal, infant, and childhood nurture, and the social and cultural environment, over which human beings have no control. Thus, while we can will what they choose (open a door, pull a trigger), we cannot choose what we choose. And just as it makes no sense to blame a tornado for destroying your house, no one deserves to be treated better or worse than anyone else.
Posted by: Brian Hines | October 23, 2023 at 10:53 AM
I'm the one who brought up agency, Brian. And I'm not bringing it in as a replacement for free will, and nor am I doing "philosophy" here. I'm just trying to understand how this thing stands up, without spuriously conflating free will with agency.
No, this is NOT compatibilism, not in any shape or form. You'd said the same thing when I last brought this up, and I'd tried to explain then why this ISN'T compatibilism, at all. Compatibilism is when will is considered free as long as it isn't impeded by external constraints. That's something very very different; and I agree, that is nonsensical, that whole idea, a redefinition of free will; and I don't see how this is even close to compatibilism, what I'm talking about.
I'm seeing agency as a function of complexity. When an AI further refines AI, to arrive at a hypothetical super-sophisticated AI two or three decades from now, then very likely no human will be able to figure out the exact mechanism of how it arrives at specific actions, nor predict what a specific action will amount to. As such, that AI will, for all purposes, be equipped with agency, that is, with the wherewithal, the ability --- as far as we humans can make out, at any rate --- to choose one course of action as opposed to another. That is, two AI entities, given the same starting point, may well arrive at two separate outcomes --- and we humans won't be able to predict which would do which, unless from an analysis of the "character" of the AI, much like one might assess the character of a human. As such, for all intents and purposes, as far as we humans are concerned, that AI will be possessed of agency.
But yet, it will most definitely not be possessed of free will, in as much as, at any point, should EVERYTHING about its innards as well as the universe external to it be known at one point, then, bar quantum randomness, every point both in the past as well as in the future can be calculated. That's determinism, irrefutably determinism. No free will. And yet, as far as we humans can make out, it will indeed be possessed of agency. Much like we humans are.
--------
And I hope you see, Brian, that what I'm arguing isn't anywhere close to compatibilism, at all. Compatibilism is when free will is redefined to mean that one's will is not obstructed by something external, to put it in rough words. That's nonsensical, the whole compatibilsim idea, I agree; but I don't see why you keep bringing that creature up here, that compabilism thingy, in context of what I say.
And nor, obviously, is there any question of bringing in any immaterial soul into this. I think we can take it as our starting point that there is no such thing, and that we are dealing with a material universe (obviously bar evidence to the contrary, but that's probably an unnecessary qualification, given that so far there is no such evidence).
----------
Sure, Sapolksy has great credential, not doubting that for a minute. Absolutely, the odds are that he's right and I'm wrong, given those credentials of his. Just, I don't understand this. I've explained clearly what I don't understand about this. I've tried to clearly spell out my objection to this, as I see it. I'd love to have it clearly explained to me what I'm getting wrong here --- if indeed that is the case.
Otherwise, as far as I can see, what this amounts to is a conflation of free will with agency. An unwarranted conflation that renders this thesis incoherent. (Again, I don't insist I'm right, and in fact do see that the odds are I'm not. In fact, I've zero vested interest here, and I'll be sincerely happy to be shown that what I'm saying is wrong. But I would, very much, like to know how exactly I'm wrong, what exactly I'm not getting here. ...Sorry, Brian, but I don't see how I can possibly accept this thing otherwise. For that matter, I don't see how anyone can accept this thing, without first clearly understanding why this objection that I raise does not hold up.)
Posted by: Appreciative Reader | October 23, 2023 at 12:02 PM
I don't find this post hoc argument persuasive, at least for hard determinism. That is, I don't accept the reality of absolute determinism, where we are all absolutely devoid of free will. But by the same token, I don't hold that we have absolute free will either. Most experts on this topic agree with me.
If we look to the 2009 Phil Papers survey (basically, a survey of professional philosophers), approx 12% of the targeted faculty were of the view that there was no free will. This is a close proxy to hard determinism.
This is a slightly lower level of popularity than libertarianism about free will (approx 13%, and just shy of 60% were compatibilists.
So, hard determinism is a significant minority viewpoint.
That said, I think this essay makes sense in how it's useful to judge people with compassion for their backgrounds and afford them relative tolerance (unless maybe they're your relatives). But I confess I don't rightly know what "judgmentalism" is. We're all judging people. The world would be in far worse shape without judgment and punishment rendered for wrongdoing.
And so, I'm against determinist theory being applied to matters of law enforcement. A wonderful experiment is being conducted in California where criminals are given leniency, even let off scot-free. Everyone who follows the news knows the conclusive results of Gasconianism.
It's funny, a "backward" country like Saudi Arabia has almost zero crime. Stories abound of people in SA leaving their cars running while they run into a store, leaving valuables sitting around in public, yet theft is almost unheard of. Crimes against women are also extremely rare over there. Are the atoms in the Arab brain somehow different from ours?
Posted by: Sant64 | October 23, 2023 at 12:32 PM
@ Santmat
Did the tree brought itself into existence?
The crow
The human
Did the human brought anything into existence?
Nothing that exists, exists of its own doing!
I am not saying anything about how things come in existence I just want to make a poit that what exists, did not do it.
Everything appears so normal as we are adjusted to it but it is not ... it is not, it is an wonder ... everything that exist could not exist or in a complete unimagnable way
Any way in what exists, WE had no say, not even in our own existence
Posted by: um | October 23, 2023 at 12:45 PM
Appreciative Reader, first, you seem to be using "agency" in a unique way that I've never seen before in books about free will, or the lack thereof. Robert Sapolsky has been studying and contemplating free will for several decades. In his book, Determinism, the index only has a few references to agency. So far as I can tell they all equate agency with free will. For example, he writes:
"People define free will differently. Many focus on agency, whether a person can control their actions, act with intent. Other definitions concern whether, when a behavior occurs, the person knows there are alternatives available. Others are less concerned with what you do than with vetoing what you don't want to do...Here's the challenge to a free willer. Find me the neuron that started the process in this man's brain [of pulling the trigger of a gun], the neuron that had an action potential for no reason, where no neuron spoke to it just before...Show me a neuron (or brain) whose generation of a behavior is independent of the sum of its biological past, and for the purposes of this book, you've demonstrated free will. The point of the first half of this book is to establish that this can't be shown."
So agency has to do with making choices, as in your example of a highly sophisticated AI, Artificial Intelligence. Yet you agree that free will doesn't exist, that determinism is at work in human brains. Computers don't have neurons, they have chips, processors, input-output devices -- non-biological stuff. But all that stuff operates in ways that are increasingly similar to human neural networks.
Thus my question to you, since you are defining agency in your comment above as "to choose one course of action as opposed to another," and you appear to agree that there is nothing non-deterministic in either the human brain or a computer, no magic free will fairy dust disconnected from neurons or computer processors, how is your use of "agency" any different from what Sapolsky is arguing is no free will?
In other words, if a person or an AI chooses one course of action as opposed to another, no matter how complex or simple the choosing process is, this is simply determinism playing out in a brain or a computer. I fail to see how calling choosing "agency" changes the highly persuasive argument Sapolsky is making that every choice is founded on the basis on many different factors: previous experience, conditions in the immediate and distant environment, preferences embedded in "programming" (which in humans happens automatically, and in AI increasingly so), and such.
This is why I termed your view as being compatibilist. True, you aren't being a traditional compatibilist, but you are trying to carve out a sort of exception to no free will that you term "agency." Yet just as compatibilism accepts determinism, so do you. In my view this means that just as compatibilists try to redefine free will to include non-coerced choice, this is what you also are doing by invoking agency as a special case where a conclusion of no free will doesn't apply.
Except it seems to me that it certainly does. Again, all I see in the word "agency" is a different term for "free will," which is how Sapolsky sees things also. Here's another example of how Sapolsky uses that word.
"When we argue about whether our behavior is the product of our agency, we're not interested in random behavior, why there might have been that one time in Stockholm where Mother Teresa pulled a knife on some guy and stole his wallet. We're interested in the consistency of behavior that constitutes our moral character. And in the consistent ways in which we try to reconcile our multifaceted inconsistencies."
Posted by: Brian Hines | October 23, 2023 at 01:18 PM
"
We're interested in the consistency of behavior that constitutes our moral character. And in the consistent ways in which we try to reconcile our multifaceted inconsistencies."
Nicely inventive, and circular.
Some people are free. Others are enslaved.
We are all the product of reality.
Let's use our freedom to help each other overcome their enslavement
How hard is this to understand?
Posted by: Spence Tepper | October 23, 2023 at 03:47 PM
"there is nothing non-deterministic in either the human brain or a computer, no magic free will fairy dust disconnected from neurons or computer processors,"
To prove this would require the ability to predict every possible behavior.
But this claim has already been disapproven by science.
Science has already proven that in complex systems (and chaos theory) you can't predict the outcome over long periods of time accurately, if at all.
Fairy dust gets into the system all the time (the unknown variables).
Evolution couldn't happen without random, unexplainable variation in genetic code. Fairy dust there too, I guess.
Determinism to an Atheist is like Religion to a believer. They believe it so much that proof of it, or proof it isn't, is superfluous.
That's dogma, in both cases.
Posted by: Spence Tepper | October 23, 2023 at 04:01 PM
The real question regarding free will is who or what is it that would have free will. It cannot be anything connected with the brain/body organism as the whole organism’ processes work according to what is programmed into them be it via genetically (nature) or culturally (nurture), both of which are natural and need no other mysterious input to aid a person to live and survive in its particular environment.
Spence’s take on evolution talks about unexplained variations in genetic coding though it is well known that mutations can result from errors in DNA replication during cell division, exposure to mutagens or a viral infection. In other words, through quite natural ‘chances’ – no fairy dust needed.
And, of course science or anyone else cannot predict outcomes over long periods of time or even predict the outcomes of the next moment. One can think and plan in advance but life (nature) has a way of intervening, but fear not as the programmed determinism of any system will ensure that it respond adequately and according to observable natural laws.
None of the foregoing requires a will that is free, a will that can independently make decisions uninfluenced by past events. Nothing like a free will or any other mystical ingredient is needed to live a natural life free from the conflicts of thought induced fantasies.
Regarding who or what could ever have free will; this illusion emanates from the primary illusion of the self, the bedrock of much of how we view ourselves and the world. The self con-struct, being a mental habit, posses as many things be it an independent soul or spirit or the seat of being a separate ‘me’ or who/what I am. Once this self-structure is seen and under-stood as the transient phenomenon it is then all else falls into place.
Posted by: Ron E. | October 24, 2023 at 04:47 AM
A further problem with hard determinism: If every event is causally determined by forces beyond our control, then this must include the event of the determinist concluding that determinism is true. But this admission seems to undermine the whole idea of arriving at our beliefs through a process of rational reflection. It also seems to render pointless the whole business of debating issues like free will and determinism, since it is already predetermined who will hold what view. Someone making this objection doesn’t have to deny that all our thought processes have correlated physical processes going on in the brain. But there is still something odd about treating one’s beliefs as the necessary effect of these brain processes rather than as the result of reflection. On these grounds, some critics view hard determinism as self-refuting.
Another problem, that determined refusal to be addressed: Since moral responsibility seems to require free will, hard determinism implies that people are not morally responsible for their actions.
Practical philosophy needs to match one's beliefs. If one truly believes that morality is an illusion, how can they offer social and political opinions that blame others for their actions?
Posted by: Sant64 | October 24, 2023 at 06:31 AM
@ Sant mat 64
As long as the concept of WILL is not property defined ..any discussion is pointless.
Posted by: um | October 24, 2023 at 06:56 AM
Hi Ron
You wrote:
"None of the foregoing requires a will that is free, a will that can independently make decisions uninfluenced by past events. "
Yes and no. Relative Free will, as a result of the influence of different, new variables / events happens all the time.
A child who was once delinquent is taken into a home by loving and patient foster parents. Eventually, they help the child learn different ways of responding. They have a natural love for the child and so they adopt them. They help the child make different choices. Now that child is relatively free of the environment and the variables that helped shape their delinquent behavior. And over time that behavior begins to fade away, replaced with more functional behavior.
The child is "Relatively" free now. Certainly can act with much greater freedom than before, when it was imprisoned by emotion and reaction, and the poor influence of those with whom the child lived before they were adopted.
You can say that in all instances the forces around them and within them made them who they are. But now they have greater freedom of choice and behavior than before. And they can now hold responsibility that they could not before. When they err, they respond immediately to fix it. They adapt functionally to feedback, and can also help others by taking on some of the overwhelming responsibility the others face, and in time help them to lighten their burden and then completely shoulder it.
Now they, and those they have helped, are relatively free. They have relative freedom, relative free will to choose amongst a much broader set of choices, and they have the depth of compassion, humanity, discipline and skill to take on huge responsibility that is a great help and value to their communities.
The abstract notion of being free of ALL influences is just a straw man. It has no functional value at all. In fact it isn't logical, because without any development, without any positive influence, there is just a vacuum. Free will really means freedom from negative influences under the influence of positive ones. Relative free will.
But it is the case that the more responsible one becomes, the more they are driven by internal values and not the negative influences around them.
Again, their proper use of their free will allows them to do so.
So when we see people misbehave, when we see terrorism for example, we understand this is how they were taught. But we also know they can come under better influences and learn better ways, more self-discipline, deferred gratification, etc so that they themselves grow inner and outer freedom.
The entire courts system is all about helping shape behavior, helping place people in a better environment. It's understood everyone is the product of reality. Real justice isn't retribution. It's changing things so everyone can be free. Free to be productive, free to help one another, free to be a resource and sanctuary for one another. All people.
Posted by: Spence Tepper | October 24, 2023 at 08:26 AM
Hi Ron:
These moral qualities of harmlessness, self-discipline, kindness, helpfulness, deferred gratification, self-control, self-discipline, diligence, creativity and invention are all developed qualities, building upon natural potentials. They must be built and developed to be fully realized. And we are all learning and adapting creatures, in every age.
Therefore when we see mis-behavior, it can't be to make personal attributions, but to look at the environment, influences, forces, and work to change those for the good.
We can't say "It's not your fault" when that individual is causing harm. We can help develop that individual to respond to the phrase "this is your fault" with a little self-examination, effort to listen, to adapt and to heal the wounds their behavior has caused with work and kindness.
The captain of a ship takes full responsibility even for the behavior of each member of the crew they may not see. But a wise captain fully understands, and creates assignments for the crew that benefit their development, and grows their responsibility, and their freedom.
Posted by: Spence Tepper | October 24, 2023 at 08:38 AM
Spence. Relative free will. Just another name for multiple choices that are determined by past accumulated data automatically regurgitated as appropriate.
Posted by: Ron E. | October 24, 2023 at 08:42 AM
Hi Ron:
You wrote:
"And, of course science or anyone else cannot predict outcomes over long periods of time or even predict the outcomes of the next moment."
Predictability is in fact the proof that what you say "caused" something actually did. All of determinism rests upon the evidence for predictability.
When predictability cannot be established, you have in-determinism. You can try to explain the possible factors that caused your prediction to fail. But you have no actual proof of those...The proof would be that you can predict accurately the effect those factors will have.
Predictability is the only scientific proof of cause and effect.
So, for example, when the hypothesis of evolution can actually be tested (which it has many, many times in genetics and biology) and result in predictable change, predictable variation, then you have now the theory of evolution, proven.
When predictability is lost, you no longer have absolute determinism. You have in-determinism as part and parcel of it....Which is another way to say that we don't know all that's going on. Every dogmatic philosopher can't live that way. But then again every scientist lives in the unknown. And that is why philosophers rarely dabble in scientific inquiry, through that doesn't stop them from pontificating about science.
Philosophers must prove their views, hence they can't allow the notion of the unknown to exist. Their philosophy must reach into omniscience.
Scientists, in order to prove facts, must acknowledge the influence of the unknown upon their findings, and account for that in some way. They can't afford to pretend, as do philosophers, that their understanding is complete and omniscient.
It's hysterical to see dogmatic atheists attempt to coopt science but avoid adopting the humility that science requires.
Brian wrote a few weeks ago that we don't know what we don't know. To a scientist this is seen all the time, in their research. And so they adopt a humbler attitude about things.
But not a philosopher. All hail the titanic opinion.
Posted by: Spence Tepper | October 24, 2023 at 08:56 AM
Hi Ron:
You wrote:
"Spence. Relative free will. Just another name for multiple choices that are determined by past accumulated data automatically regurgitated as appropriate."
Partly correct, but missing something. Could be new accumulated data, new experiences, new influences that broaden choices and the personal power to effectively overcome the past that enslaves, and pursue the choices that liberate!
Posted by: Spence Tepper | October 24, 2023 at 08:59 AM
It is much easier to see something than to guess about it.
But guessing is fine if it leads to the practice of looking in order to actually see.
Seeing is enlightenment. When you see things working together, interacting, which you had not seen before, then understanding, and compassion rise naturally. And so do solutions. But keep looking, because often the solution is already on the way. And the next "problem"...and so what is good and bad, problem and solution are seen as waves, variations, natural and gentle in each second, but often cataclysmic as they accumulate.
So, we should all be looking, acting to become more aware, and learning to enjoy the process of gentle, calm, open minded, non-judgmental looking. We have the tools for it, the potential for it built into us. When we get really good at looking, and that means submitting who we are, becoming nothing so that we really can look without interference from our past, we start seeing.
Is that freedom? If we can free ourselves of ourselves for a few moments with a little help from the power to do so within us, yes, I'd say that's freedom. If you can choose the escalator to visit the next floor up, yes, that's freedom from the rabble taking place here on the ground floor.
Posted by: Spence Tepper | October 24, 2023 at 09:14 AM
All those here arguing for hard determinism, please explain why you still believe in ethics and morality.
You can't argue that all our actions are preordained, and at the same time believe in standards of right and wrong. You can't have it both ways.
Posted by: Sant64 | October 24, 2023 at 10:08 AM
Brian, thanks for taking the time and effort for that focused addressing of the points I’d raised! Appreciate it, absolutely!
Like I said, I’m not arguing in favor of a particular position, only merely trying to understand this all better, and pointing out the apparent incoherencies here (as it appears to me), to see if you might help me figure out what I cannot for myself. While this does appear incoherent to me, but I realize that chances are that that’s simply a function of my own failure to understand the argument.
Towards that end, and in that spirit --- and emphatically not in the sense of a rebuttal --- I’ll venture to address your comment to me. And I’ll try to organize my thoughts into separately numbered segments, to make for ease of reading, and to make it convenient for you when addressing me back.
And, with all of that, I’ll try to put into words the thoughts floating around inside my head, that seem to be making some kind of sense out of the incoherence I find here. (And I’ll do that with the full expectation that I’ll likely be shown to be wrong on both counts, that is, in terms of both the incoherency I see, as well as the solution I propose. And what’s more, I’m completely happy to be shown that, since, either way, that will make for my better and clearer understanding of this subject.)
...Sorry, this will likely end up a long comment! Hopefully my organizing it into segments will help keep it relatively coherent, despite the length!
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(1)
“Appreciative Reader, first, you seem to be using "agency" in a unique way that I've never seen before in books about free will, or the lack thereof.”
“For example, he writes: …"People define free will differently. Many focus on agency, whether a person can control their actions, act with intent. Other definitions concern whether, when a behavior occurs, the person knows there are alternatives available. Others are less concerned with what you do than with vetoing what you don't want to do…”
Oh, absolutely, Brian, that’s my own particular usage of the term “agency”. Not drawing on how the term is used in the literature by different authors --- which literature I’m largely ignorant of, in any case, beyond what I’ve seen you discuss here about it all --- but rather on how I myself have used that term in my past comments on your blog, when responding to earlier posts. So that, I’m fine with using some other term for it instead if you like, or even leaving out specific terms altogether if you wish and simply discussing the idea itself. (I’ll get down to addressing your specific question to me about that term presently.)
I’d like to touch on the definitions part first, a bit, even though this wasn’t part of your either my comment upthread or of yours, because I think it’s crucial to this discussion. You’ve quoted Sapolsky as saying that people define free will differently. I think what’s key is how Sapolsky himself defines the term. I think every writer, when discussing these ideas, should start off by first defining, very clearly and completely unambiguously, these terms as they use them in their discussion, as well as a brief discussion on and defense of their particular definition. Otherwise this all leads to --- well, I find myself falling back on that same pejorative-sounding term, even though I don’t really mean it pejoratively really --- I was saying, otherwise this all leads to, well, incoherency, as it appears to me. Let me spell out why, by recounting what I’ve already said in a past comment to you back when we were discussing Wegner here.
Remember that diagram you’d presented from Wegner, some years back and then one more time some weeks/months back? The one that showed two paths, with leading to , and thence to , along one of the paths; and the other path leading from following the and leading directly to ? Where he showed that the science points to the latter path as a true description of what actually happens? …And also, I’ll take your attention back to those experiments that you’d discussed years back, the details of which are foggy in my mind, but it involves subjects pressing a button to indicate their choice while being MRI’d, or some such, to study their brain states, which showed that we were already set on a course of action before we ourselves even became conscious of our “will” to that action.
At this point, let’s first define free will, loosely and for purposes of this part of the discussion. Will, I’d say, can be thought of as our impulse of and propensity towards doing something (using the term “doing” loosely and broadly). And free will would be that impulse, that propensity, that is free of past causal constraints, that is to say free of determinism (even if not necessarily of surface-level conditioning). That usage would comport with the philosophical as well as religious (and specifically theodical) etymology of and around that term.
So that, working with that definition of free will, neither Wegner’s diagram, nor that celebrated experiment from years ago, actually has to do with free will at all. Isn’t it? If it is the case that the unconscious causes of thought lead to thoughts, and it is those thoughts that are directly instrumental in causing actions --- which is not the case, but even had that been that case --- even then, there’s no free will, in as much as the unconscious causes of thoughts are themselves the function of …well, the whole host of variables both internal to the person’s brain, and the wider universe external to it.
Sorry for this lengthy detour, but my point here --- a crucial point, I think --- is that none of this discussion is about free will at all. Since in either case there’s no free will, therefore which of the two routes in the diagram it is that science bears out, becomes completely irrelevant to the question of whether there is free will. So that, and like I’d remarked in very brief in my first comment in this thread, clearly what is being discussed here is something different than free will, even though the discussion purports to be about free will. And I suggest that what the discussion is de facto about is not so much free will, as agency. And by agency, here, I refer to whether or not we can deliberately and consciously and via our thoughts directly affect our actions.
I hope we’re on the same page so far, Brian? At this point I’m merely pointing out the confusion arising from using these terms without first clearly defining them, and thereby by conflating different usages of these terms. Particularly the term free will. And trying to show how, as I see it, while the discussion purports to be about free will, but in actuality it is not about free will at all, but instead about …well, agency.
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(2)
“Thus my question to you, since you are defining agency in your comment above as "to choose one course of action as opposed to another," and you appear to agree that there is nothing non-deterministic in either the human brain or a computer, no magic free will fairy dust disconnected from neurons or computer processors, how is your use of "agency" any different from what Sapolsky is arguing is no free will?”
First, Brian, see what I’ve said in the previous section, #1. I hope I’ve been able to show how “agency”, as I’ve used it, is very different than “free will”, as I’ve defined it. How that comports with Sapolsky’s definitions I’m not sure, because I haven’t actually seen him clearly present his own definition of those terms. But the point is, and regardless of the terms we use, these are two different animals, that we often end up conflating, and that conflation results in unnecessary confusion. Free will, as I’ve used it, would refer to our will to something, our innate propensity towards something, our impulse towards (doing) something, that is, deep within and beyond reach of surface-level conditioning, independent of past causal influences. Free will, thus defined, clearly does not exist. And agency, as I’ve used that term, refers to our deliberate and conscious and via-our-thoughts willing of something, even as our thoughts themselves are beyond our control, and thus bereft of free will. (And neuroscience seems to be showing us that this agency thingy does not exist either, but that is a different discussion than whether free will exists.)
As for how I’ve used “agency” in my comments in this thread --- as a de facto artifact simply of complexity --- I’ll spell that out in the next-but-one segment (#4).
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(3)
“This is why I termed your view as being compatibilist. True, you aren't being a traditional compatibilist, but you are trying to carve out a sort of exception to no free will that you term "agency." Yet just as compatibilism accepts determinism, so do you. In my view this means that just as compatibilists try to redefine free will to include non-coerced choice, this is what you also are doing by invoking agency as a special case where a conclusion of no free will doesn't apply.”
Okay, I kind-of get where you were sort-of coming from, when you described my argument --- pardon me, but mistakenly described my argument --- as compatibilist.
Not to beat this compatibilism business to death; but, in order to shove aside once and for all any further references to compatibilism, let me just spell out two things here within the space of this section:
First, and as you yourself point out, what comapitibilism amounts to (redefining free will to refer to addressing whether our will is impeded by external constraints) is nothing remotely like what I’m saying here.
And secondly, and importantly: The compatibilist argument seeks to force-fit a “compatibility” between free will and determinism; it seeks to show, through the subterfuge of crass redefinition, that free will can be “compatible” with empiricism. I do no such thing. I take it as my starting point that free will does not exist, as following directly, and trivially, from a materialist paradigm. (What I’m saying, like I’ve discussed already at some length, is that agency is different than free will; and that the whole discussion here, and elsewhere as well, has to do not so much with free will as with agency; and that conflating these two very different things, that conflating these two very different usages of the term “free will”, makes for unnecessary confusion, that takes away from the coherence of the larger discussion itself.)
TLDR: Compatibilism has nothing at all to do with any of what I’m saying here. Although I do get, basis what you say, why you might have started out thinking that it might; but I’ve tried to clearly spell out here why that’s not the case, at all.
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(4)
“how is your use of "agency" any different from what Sapolsky is arguing is no free will?”
I’ve already addressed this in some length in my #3 above, but I just wanted to clarify here, in context of that earlier section (#3), what I’ve already said in my comments upthread:
Free will as I’d defined it, does not exist. Agency, as I’ve defined it, is different than free will (as I’ve defined it); but neuroscience seems to be showing us that agency does not exist either, so in a way that distinction, while real, is kind of moot. However, there is one sense in which “agency”, within scare quotes, does exist. (I now realize, while typing this, that I’m guilty myself of what I’d complained of in others earlier: that is, I’ve ended up using the term “agency” in two different senses, and in conflating the two senses I’ve myself made for unnecessary confusion. Let me now try to correct that by referring to this not as “agency”, but instead as ‘de-facto agency’, or maybe as “pseudo-agency”.)
A super-complex super-sophisticated AI of the future, or for that matter a human being, is deterministic, in that in theory everything about this entity can be calculated exactly. (I’m ignoring indeterminacy arising out of quantum randomness, since that doesn’t make for free will either, and in that sense is moot as far as this focused discussion.) However, in practice, since we don’t actually have information about hundreds, maybe thousands --- millions maybe --- of variables that might be relevant here; nor do we actually know about all of the myriad relations, the functions, connecting all of those variables; and since I suppose in practice we also wouldn’t be possessed of the extravagantly high processing power that would be needed to make sense of all of this, even had we somehow been able to come to know all of these functions and the values of all of these variables: therefore, in practice, these super complex entities would, by virtue of their sheer complexity, be beyond our powers of prediction; and therefore, for all intents and purposes, such a complex entity (whether an AI or a human) would indeed be possessed of pseudo-agency, that is, the ability to choose one option other than another, in a way that is in practice inscrutable to us, following a mechanism the full details of which are de facto unknown to us.
And now I come to the part where I directly answer how what I’m suggesting differs from what Sapolsky is arguing. Given that a human being, and an AI-of-the-future, is possessed of this extreme complexity, and therefore this pseudo-agency; and given that we can’t predict what choices it will make: how then do we make some kind of sense of this entity? And the answer is, through value judgments. Let me try to flesh out that thought further in the paragraph below:
We therefore admire, and strive to inculcate within ourselves, such qualities as honesty, and integrity, and compassion, and so on. We do apportion praise, and blame as well, for such attributes as appear to us praiseworthy or blameworthy. In doing which we recognize that we have no free will; but we also recognize that we are complex way beyond what we can meaningfully analyze casually to the minute detail that de-facto determinism would entail; and to further recognize that we are thus, in effect, for all intents and purposes, possessed of pseudo-agency; and to consciously follow a consequentialist-ish value system in terms of what we admire and what we praise (and the obverse, as well).
That is how my thinking on this, and my use of “agency” differs from what we’ve discussed here about what Sapolsky is arguing.
----------
TLDR:
One, I try to clearly show here how different senses of the term “free will” seem to be conflated here, which makes for confusion, and also incoherence, in terms of what is being argued (see what I had to say about Wegner’s diagram, for instance).
Two, I suggest that in discussing these ideas people first and foremost clearly define their terms; and, towards that end, I try to tease out two separate senses, calling the first “free will”, and the second “agency”.
Three, I try to show, once and for all, that compatibilism does not enter into what I’m discussing.
Four, in this comment I realize I’d myself been conflating two senses of the word “agency”; and to correct that, introduce ‘de-facto agency’, or “pseudo-agency”, to distinguish it from “agency” proper.
And five, I discuss how this seems to make for a more reasonable interpretation of free will; where while one does clearly recognize that there is no free will, while one clearly recognizes the limits of human agency and thereby tempers one’s judgmentalism; but one does not go to the extravagant and, as it seems to me, fallacious extreme, of treating humans like tornadoes, and forgoing judgments altogether.
This, as far as I can see, makes sense of a thesis that, at least to my eyes, seems not to make sense really. (And I all of this discussion, all of this thinking, I place here very tentatively, and very diffidently, with full realization that the odds are I’m wrong about this, and the whole battalions of neuroscientists, whom I’m taking issue with here, are right about this. Except, I don’t quite see how, at least not off of my own steam.)
Posted by: Appreciative Reader | October 24, 2023 at 12:43 PM
Correction:
The first sentence of my section #4 (following your quote) makes two references back to my earlier section #3. Those references are actually about my earlier section #2. So that in that first sentence of my section #4, please replace/read the two places where I say "section #3", as 'section #2'.
And if that sounds absurdly convoluted --- as, frankly, it does to me as I read back on what I've just now written in the previous paragraph! --- then just read what I've written as I've written it; and hopefully that small error in labeling won't really matter.
Posted by: Appreciative Reader | October 24, 2023 at 12:53 PM
All sentient beings are made in such a way that they are programmed to stay alive, to survive .... they can NOT kill themselves.
They have neither a will of their own to live or to die
They exist to live to survive.... for reasons they do not know...like the sun and the moon. They are there but to not know why; they just do what they are made to do
We cannot will to be other what we are and what we are is not willed by us.
We exist like the crow
The only difference is that the crow doesn't drink coffee.
P.S.
Language does not allow me to formulate it otherwise. Again, I make no statements or claims about a maker, creator.
Those that kill them self, kill them self to live, to survive. Not need to argue with me about this issue as I have close knowledge of it within the circle of those that are near and dear to me.
Posted by: um | October 24, 2023 at 03:05 PM
Oh, another correction there, in that comment of mine:
In Section #1, the paragraph that starts with the words, "Remember that diagram you’d presented from Wegner...", afraid it all looks completely incoherent. I think I see what's happened there. I'd used triangular brackets there, to represent Wegner's diagram; and I think the blog software may have interpreted those as html codes, and therefore swallowed up entirely the text within the triangular brackets.
What I'll do now is try to correct the damage, and re-fashion that paragraph using square brackets instead. Hopefully that should do the trick.
So that, the paragraph in my Section #1, that starts with the words, "Remember that diagram you’d presented from Wegner..." should instead read as follows:
Remember that diagram you’d presented from Wegner, some years back and then one more time some weeks/months back? The one that showed two paths, with [Unconscious Cause of Thought] leading to [Thought], and thence to [Action], along one of the paths; and the other path leading from [Unconscious Cause of Thought] following the [Actual Causal Path] and leading directly to [Action]? Where he showed that the science points to the latter path as a true description of what actually happens? …And also, I’ll take your attention back to those experiments that you’d discussed years back, the details of which are foggy in my mind, but it involves subjects pressing a button to indicate their choice while being MRI’d, or some such, to study their brain states, which showed that we were already set on a course of action before we ourselves even became conscious of our “will” to that action.
Posted by: Appreciative Reader | October 24, 2023 at 06:27 PM
Appreciative Reader, I'm sorry that you were upset that I referred to your position on "agency" in my recent blog post as not understanding what Sapolsky is saying. But that's the truth. You admit that you chose to use that term, "agency," in a way that isn't used by Sapolsky and other writers on free will, since agency is viewed as synonymous with free will.
If you use words in a unique way, you should expect to run into problems when discussing some subject. What you seem to mean by "agency" is using reason and other methods of mental consideration to arrive at a choice between alternatives. OK, but as I've noted to you, that's just a case of determinism. If you'd said "choice" or "ability to choose" rather than "agency," I wouldn't have objected to your statements.
That said, I should have been more aware that you don't understand much about Sapolsky's views aside from what I've shared in my blog posts, which is a small fraction of his sophisticated arguments. I knew that Sapolsky had said in the early chapters of his book that experiments dealing with when and how we choose, as in the Libet research, don't prove the illusion of free will. So you were beating a dead horse in your second lengthy comment. But since you thought the horse was alive, since you haven't read Sapolsky's book, I should have realized this.
Please understand that I have a lot going on in my life, as we all do, and I only read and respond to comments at certain times of the day. So like I said, this makes having a productive dialog via comments difficult. Misunderstandings are bound to occur. I always enjoy your comments a lot, so keep on doing what you're doing: writing intelligent well-reasoned comments. I'd simply suggest using generally accepted terms as much as possible, since it was your unique usage of "agency" that first set off alarm bells in my mind.
Posted by: Brian Hines | October 25, 2023 at 10:53 AM