

**37. Vested Rights.** A vested right based upon substantial expenditures toward construction of a building is properly viewed as an inchoate nonconforming use, not as a distinct entitlement immune from all limitations applicable to nonconforming uses. *Fountain Village Dev. Co. v. Multnomah County*, 39 Or LUBA 207 (2000).

**37. Vested Rights.** Vested rights, like nonconforming use rights, may be lost where the holder fails to diligently exercise those rights, *i.e.*, the holder must continue development of the nonconforming use and not abandon or discontinue efforts to complete development. *Fountain Village Dev. Co. v. Multnomah County*, 39 Or LUBA 207 (2000).

**37. Vested Rights.** Statutory provisions governing nonconforming uses at ORS 215.130 also govern vested rights, including the delegation of authority to counties to establish criteria under which such rights have been interrupted or abandoned. *Fountain Village Dev. Co. v. Multnomah County*, 39 Or LUBA 207 (2000).

**37. Vested Rights.** Abandonment of a vested right, like abandonment of a nonconforming use, requires evidence of intent to relinquish a known right. Where the only evidence relevant to intent shows that the landowner maintained the uncompleted structure during the relevant period, the county errs in determining that the landowner has abandoned the right to complete and use the structure. *Fountain Village Dev. Co. v. Multnomah County*, 39 Or LUBA 207 (2000).

**37. Vested Rights.** Where the county views a vested right to be discontinued under its code if there is discontinuance of substantial effort to finish the development for any reason for more than two years, evidence that the landowner maintained an uncompleted structure but made no effort to finish the structure for three years was sufficient to support a finding of discontinuance. *Fountain Village Dev. Co. v. Multnomah County*, 39 Or LUBA 207 (2000).

**37. Vested Rights.** That a use is authorized under a zoning ordinance or granted building or zoning permits does not, alone, shield the use from later-adopted zoning ordinance amendments that prohibit the use or impose a requirement for additional permits. *Rochlin v. Multnomah County*, 35 Or LUBA 333 (1998).

**37. Vested Rights.** The judicial doctrine of vested rights does not apply to development allowed under a conditional use permit, where the permit is approved under an ordinance obligating the user to commence construction within six months or request an extension from the city. *Heidgerken v. Marion County*, 35 Or LUBA 313 (1998).

**37. Vested Rights.** Prior to the creation of LUBA, circuit courts had jurisdiction to declare the existence of vested rights to develop land under previously existing land use regulations. *DLCD v. Benton County*, 27 Or LUBA 49 (1994).

**37. Vested Rights.** Claim preclusion applies to preclude relitigation of a claim that has been litigated. Where a party's claim of a vested right to residential use of certain property was determined in a circuit court judgment, to which the local government and other parties to the LUBA appeal were also parties, the local government is precluded

from making a new determination on that vested right claim, even if it would otherwise have jurisdiction to do so. *Joines v. Linn County*, 24 Or LUBA 456 (1993).

**37. Vested Rights.** In the absence of a code requirement to the contrary, a provision in a local code authorizing the development of a parcel to proceed to completion so long as "substantial construction" occurs within a certain period of time does not require the application of a traditional vested rights analysis. *Columbia River Television v. Multnomah County*, 24 Or LUBA 82 (1992).

**37. Vested Rights.** Where the issue on appeal is whether petitioner has a vested right to develop property in a manner inconsistent with current zoning regulations, and the resolution of that issue requires the application of city land use regulations from 1973 to the present, the challenged decision is a land use decision subject to LUBA's jurisdiction. *Terraces Condo Assoc. v. City of Portland*, 22 Or LUBA 151 (1991).

**37. Vested Rights.** Where a local government approved a height variance in 1977, but at that time had no code provision authorizing density transfers or a master plan approval process, the 1977 height variance approval does not also authorize a density transfer or give master plan approval. *Terraces Condo Assoc. v. City of Portland*, 22 Or LUBA 151 (1991).

**37. Vested Rights.** To establish a vested right to construct 150 units on a particular lot, a local government must determine that qualified expenditures were made toward development of that particular lot at a time when the construction of 150 units on that lot did not require approval from such local government, or were made at a time when the required approvals were given. *Terraces Condo Assoc. v. City of Portland*, 22 Or LUBA 151 (1991).

**37. Vested Rights.** The lawful uses protected from newly enacted regulations include those which do not yet exist, but have proceeded towards completion to a significant degree. In such instances, the property owner is said to have a *vested right* to complete and continue the development. *Schmaltz v. City of Hood River*, 22 Or LUBA 115 (1991).

**37. Vested Rights.** Expenditures considered in determining the existence of a vested right must have been made at a time when the proposed development did not require approvals, or at a time when required approvals were given. *Lung v. Marion County*, 21 Or LUBA 302 (1991).

**37. Vested Rights.** Where property owners have not applied for and obtained a required conditional use permit prior to a change to a more restrictive zone, they cannot acquire a vested right to complete development of a use which required conditional use approval under the original zoning. *Lung v. Marion County*, 21 Or LUBA 302 (1991).

**37. Vested Rights.** The expenditures considered in determining the existence of a vested right must be made at a time when the proposed development did not require approvals, or at a time when required approvals were given. Where no local partition approval was

given prior to the adoption of an ordinance requiring such approval, the only expenditures which may be considered in a vested rights determination are those made before the effective date of such ordinance. *Crone v. Clackamas County*, 21 Or LUBA 102 (1991).

**37. Vested Rights.** Evidence that at a time when development was allowed, a landowner placed two homes on the parent parcel and obtained two septic, plumbing and well drilling permits for such parcel, at best, establishes that the landowner contemplated creating two parcels from the parent parcel. However, these expenditures are not "substantially and directly" related to further dividing the parent parcel. *Crone v. Clackamas County*, 21 Or LUBA 102 (1991).

**37. Vested Rights.** Under *Holmes* factor (7) ("ratio of expenditures"), a local government is required to identify and compare the total project cost with only those expenditures that are properly considered in determining the existence of a vested right. *DLCD v. Curry County*, 19 Or LUBA 249 (1990).

**37. Vested Rights.** Distinguishing those expenditures *properly* considered in a determination of the "ratio of expenditures" under *Holmes* factor (7) requires (1) identification of the time at which the expenditures were made, (2) an analysis of whether the expenditures were made in good faith and lawful when made, and (3) a determination regarding whether the expenditures are directly related to the proposed use of the property. *DLCD v. Curry County*, 19 Or LUBA 249 (1990).

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**37. Vested Rights.** After the Oregon Supreme Court issued a decision determining that Goal 14 must be complied with before the existing zoning of the subject property could be considered lawfully applied, any expenditures made in contemplation of dividing and developing the subject property, consistent with the existing zoning, could not properly be considered in a vested rights determination. *DLCD v. Curry County*, 19 Or LUBA 249 (1990).

**37. Vested Rights.** There is no general rule that all expenditures relating to development of land in Oregon, made in furtherance of a vested right, must have been made before promulgation of the Statewide Planning Goals. *DLCD v. Curry County*, 19 Or LUBA 249 (1990).

**37. Vested Rights.** In the absence of findings, or evidence in the record, which establishes that the price paid for purchase of a 10,000-square-foot parcel was a "premium" or an otherwise unreasonable price to pay to enlarge the parent parcel for the division and development which has already occurred, the purchase price for the 10,000-square-foot lot should not be included in the qualified expenditures used to determine

existence of a vested right to create additional parcels developable with three residences. *DLCD v. Curry County*, 19 Or LUBA 249 (1990).

**37. Vested Rights.** Where the total qualified expenditures are at most 2,480.68 dollars, total development cost is 126,000 dollars, and the ratio of expenditures to cost is, therefore, at most 1:50, this expenditure total and "ratio of expenditures" under *Holmes* factor (7) are, as a matter of law, insufficient to demonstrate that the amount of expenditures is "substantial," and do not establish the existence of a vested right. *DLCD v. Curry County*, 19 Or LUBA 249 (1990).

**37. Vested Rights.** Under *Holmes* factor (7) ("ratio of expenditures"), a local government is required to identify and compare the total project cost with only those expenditures which are properly considered in determining the existence of a vested right. *DLCD v. Curry County*, 19 Or LUBA 237 (1990).

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**37. Vested Rights.** In order to determine the "ratio of expenditures" under *Holmes* factor (7), a local government must adopt a finding concerning total project cost. *DLCD v. Curry County*, 19 Or LUBA 237 (1990).